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It is the hub of UK energy research and the gateway 
between the UK and international energy research 
communities. Its interdisciplinary, whole-systems 
research informs UK policy development and  
research strategy.
•  UKERC’s Meeting Place, based in Oxford, serves  
the whole of the UK research community and its popular 
events, designed to tackle interdisciplinary topics and 
facilitate knowledge exchange and collaboration, are 
regularly oversubscribed –  
www.ukerc.ac.uk/support/TheMeetingPlace
•  The National Energy Research Network provides  
regular updates on news, jobs, events, opportunities and 
developments across the energy field in the  
form of a popular weekly newsletter –  
www.ukerc.ac.uk/support/NERN
•  UKERC’s Research Atlas is the definitive information 
resource for current and past UK energy research and 
development activity. The online database also has 
information on energy-related research capabilities 
in the UK and a series of energy roadmaps showing 
research problems to be overcome before new 
technologies can be commercially viable –  
http://ukerc.rl.ac.uk
•  UKERC is also the research delivery partner in the 
Technology Strategy Board’s Knowledge Transfer 
Network (KTN) for Energy Generation and Supply,  
with responsibility for analysis of future and  
emerging opportunities. The KTN aims to accelerate  
the innovation of technology across the energy 
generation and supply landscape
•  All UKERC’s publications and articles can be accessed via 
our online Publications Catalogue, which you can link to 
from our home page – www.ukerc.ac.uk
About UKERC
The UK Energy Research Centre carries out world-class 
research into sustainable energy systems. 
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The analysis provides an indication of key areas of public 
acceptability relating to whole energy system change, and 
offers insights into the factors that mediate and underpin 
views on transitions. Understanding the connections, 
associations and contextual issues that underlay public 
perspectives offers an important means for thinking 
through potential difficulties and opportunities in 
achieving major system change. 
This report is structured around ten cross-cutting analytic 
themes which are interlinked.
1. Meta-Issues: Climate Change and Energy 
Security 
Views on climate change evoked a range of responses 
from different forms of scepticism to high levels of 
concern. Energy security as a term was not salient to 
people but the range of concerns that it encompasses 
(e.g. geopolitical issues, energy shortages, black outs, 
unaffordable prices) did evoke strong reactions. Though 
discourses did encompass concerns about national level 
security and supplies of fossil fuels, there was a much 
stronger focus on the services that energy supports 
and personal access to energy. The key message is that 
views on overarching meta-issues, like climate change 
and energy security, while still extremely important as 
narratives underpinning reasons for change, may be less 
significant than one might expect in determining views  
on specific aspects of system transformation.
2. Imagining Energy System Change 
Almost all of our participants expressed enthusiasm 
for addressing contemporary problems by doing things 
differently. This enthusiasm for change centred on the 
desire for what might broadly be termed a “sustainable” 
energy system. This notion encompasses naturalness, 
cleanliness, healthiness, the infinite nature of something 
(in terms of resources), but also things that do not 
generate conflicts/wars, or involve “waste”. These more 
abstract aspects or values were attached to particular 
technologies and processes within energy system change, 
such as renewable forms of energy production and 
efficiency. Indeed, renewable forms of production were 
particularly desired and are notable as forming a central 
part of our participants’ visions of sustainable energy 
systems. 
3. Affordability, Responsibility and Trust for 
Energy System Transitions 
Questions relating to “who pays” for system transitions 
were bound up with discussions of energy bills and costs 
more generally, as well as with concerns regarding trust 
and responsibility. A sense of powerlessness regarding 
energy pricing and costs was indicative of views that the 
market does not operate in a way that allows ordinary 
people to exert consumer power. Though concern about 
bills did undoubtedly form an important aspect of public 
discourse, this did not translate straight-forwardly in to 
rejection of more costly routes to change. There was also 
some evidence to indicate that if the reasons for bill rises 
were to pay for particularly desirable aspects of transition 
(e.g. renewable energy) they are regarded more favourably. 
However cost is unlikely to be straightforwardly “traded 
off” against other aspects of energy system transition 
because of the numerous elements encompassed within 
concern about the issue.
4. Uncertainty, Risk Making and Risk Taking 
It was deemed extremely important that technological 
developments across the whole system – established 
and emergent – are safe. Our participants articulated 
sophisticated understandings of the likelihood and scale 
of risks. Socio-political risks represented a key concern 
in relation to certain forms of energy generation. In 
particular, the potential for resource conflicts in relation 
to fossil fuels represented one of the underlying reasons 
for many excluding these energy sources from their future 
visions. Other issues related to the potential for land 
conflicts around energy system elements, such as biomass 
and onshore wind energy, and legacy risks (radioactive or 
carbon storage) that might be left for future generations. 
Interestingly, although micro-generation technologies 
(particularly solar) were desirable for many participants, 
talk about investing in new ways of producing energy  
(e.g. in transitioning from consumer to prosumer) was  
also imbued with a sense of personal risk.
Executive Summary
This report summarises the findings from a series of 
deliberative workshops with members of the British public 
carried out between June and October 2011 as part of an 
interdisciplinary UKERC research project: Transforming the 
UK energy system – Public values, attitudes and acceptability.
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5. Socio-technical Change, Non-transitions  
and Pessimism 
Some technologies such as carbon capture and storage 
(CCS) and bio-fuels, did not fit with the public conception 
of what a transition should be and were therefore viewed 
by our participants as ‘non-transitions’; that is, they 
were viewed as approaches that defer, rather than solve, 
energy system problems. This related to a strong and 
widely held public concern about continued reliance 
on fossil fuel supply options, which evoked particularly 
negative responses in terms of their role in future energy 
systems. In general, fossil fuels were viewed as polluting, 
archaic, finite and as sources of global conflict. Attitudes 
toward fossil fuels translated into negative views about 
CCS and, to a lesser extent, bio-energy, which were both 
associated with continuation of existing (undesirable) 
aspects of current ways of providing energy (e.g. burning 
resources). There was greater uncertainty about bio-fuels 
and as a consequence views were more ambivalent. This 
was in contrast to CCS where the direct connections 
to fossil fuels resulted in a greater intensity and wider 
ranging expression of negative perspectives. In discussing 
complex future technologies participants also expressed 
considerable technological pessimism: a sense that 
technological failure is always possible and that if the 
‘worst possible event’ is not acceptable then the action 
should be avoided. 
6. Energy Matters in Place: Politics, In(action) 
and Control 
The workshops identified how place is important for 
energy system transitions beyond concerns about changes 
to landscapes. Perspectives on transitions connect with 
a range of people’s material relations with space, both in 
the past, present and future, and everyday lives. Place is 
also associated with socio-cultural and political issues 
including trust, control, histories, power, regulation, 
imposition, and so forth. An example would be that for 
some within the groups conducted in Scotland, there were 
particular concerns with regard to CCS technology. 
Centrally, these participants struggled to see what 
benefits this industry would bring to Scotland. Many of 
the participants expressed concern that Scotland would 
be viewed unfavourably for hosting storage facilities, or 
that this would pose an unfair burden on the country. 
Place issues also relate to the home as a private space, 
and for the participants this came with the expectation 
that it should be free from government control. As such, 
measures or changes proposed that were felt to erode 
the power and control of householders within their 
homes frequently met with stiff resistance. This arose 
with some force out of discussions around particular 
demand management techniques. The core message is 
that to ignore the multi-faceted dimensions place holds 
in energy system change risks generating controversy and 
contestation, as well as missed opportunities for learning 
from mistakes and building upon past successes. 
7. Accessing Energy Futures: Challenges  
and Opportunities 
In line with previous research we found that participants 
drew heavily upon their own experiences of, for example, 
existing technologies or particular aspects of social 
systems in order to think through into the future and 
generate a sense of how they might feel about different 
aspects of change. One area in which this was particularly 
salient in terms of achieving system change was in 
relation to electrification. Throughout the research we 
found a set of quite negative experiences and more 
general ideas around existing electric heating and cooking 
systems, and (to a lesser extent) electric cars, that had 
an impact on how transitions to electrification were 
viewed. This is despite the fact that future electric systems 
are likely to differ in quite significant ways compared 
with what has come before. These types of ideas about 
electrification (especially of heat) mark out what is likely 
to be an important challenge in delivering transitions 
toward electric systems.
Though concern about bills did 
undoubtedly form an important aspect 
of public discourse, this did not translate 
straightforwardly in to rejection of 
more costly routes to change.
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8. Workers and Jobs in Energy System 
Transitions 
There was a keen recognition in our groups of the 
jobs that existing energy systems provide, and of the 
importance of system transformation in bringing new 
opportunities for jobs and skills developments within 
the UK. Participants wanted to know whether ‘cleaner’ 
forms of energy production would produce new jobs and, 
the relative implications for jobs across different forms 
of energy production: in particular who would ‘lose out’ 
or be ‘left behind’ in transitioning to different systems of 
provisioning. This core concern was also matched by a set 
of discourses around the potentially positive implications 
of transitions for job creation and economic growth, and 
a need for these to be located in the UK. In general, there 
was a sense that growing manufacturing within Britain 
would be likely to improve economic stability while also 
helping to pay for the energy transition. Narratives about 
growth and manufacturing appeared to conflict with 
participant’s views on reducing consumption and the 
more transformative kinds of change discussed in Theme 
2 above. However, such contradictions were recognised 
and addressed by participants through their discussions  
of the apparent paradoxical nature of energy transitions.
9. Governance Policies and Strategy in  
Public View 
The perceived role of government is multi-faceted 
and not unproblematic yet, at the core, publics locate 
responsibility for delivering transitions with government, 
including local, central and wider governing institutions. 
It is not necessarily the case that publics think that the 
government should lead the way, rather that they must, 
as there are no alternative groups that hold enough 
power (e.g. industry) who can also be trusted to do so in 
their stead. An apparent lack of legislation and regulatory 
action was viewed by participants as indicative of a lack 
of real commitment within government to address energy 
related issues. 
Whilst there was support for legislation to facilitate and 
enforce change, our participants also wanted policies and 
legislation to have a certain amount of flexibility to ensure 
they are responsive to different contexts, for example 
where policies might affect vulnerable groups.
10. System Links: Making Connections?
Throughout the workshops, the My2050 scenario building 
tool was utilised to keep the whole system in view 
and to direct participants to consider the implications 
of decisions about one aspect of change for other 
dimensions. Additionally, the research was designed 
so as to draw out connections (e.g. between high use 
of renewable energy and a need for improved storage 
technologies) that were not necessarily visible from 
the use of the scenario tool alone. A key way in which 
participants in the groups made connections was through 
discussion about the connectivity between their selves 
and others – this included other people, but also distant 
places and other times (pasts and futures). Fundamentally, 
our participants recognised not only the linkages within 
the UK’s energy system but also how we are part of a 
global energy system. Though participants often made 
connections between energy demand and supply, it 
was rare that they would spontaneously connect forms 
of supply with the need for increased energy demand 
management. Participants did not raise this themselves 
suggesting that it is not currently part of the public 
conception of ‘renewable energy’. When this connection 
was presented to them, however, this did not reduce 
the favourability of renewable energy technologies. 
Beyond this, our participants made linkages between 
the technical, social and political dimensions of energy 
systems. In essence, this represented recognition of the 
ways that possibilities for change were constrained or 
facilitated not only through what is technically feasible, 
but also – and perhaps more importantly – through social 
and political factors (e.g. public acceptability, existing 
institutional interests, or political support). 
There is a need to think about change in 
terms of reciprocity and consider how calls 
placed upon publics to accept changes are 
bring met with correspondent obligations 
for government and companies.
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Final Conclusions
We found the notion of ‘trade-offs’ between different 
components of energy system change unravelled 
somewhat with careful analysis of the data. Whilst 
trade-offs had less explanatory power than we 
had anticipated for understanding public attitudes, 
exploring the values that underpin people’s 
perspectives proved a much more successful strategy. 
In developing understanding of the values and ideas 
that underlay people’s views and preferences  
 
 
we offer insight into what could be the basis for a 
new social contract. Central to this will be the need 
to pay attention to existing social contracts and 
the extent to which proposed socio-technological 
changes interfere with them. In these cases there is 
a need to think about change in terms of reciprocity 
and consider how calls placed upon publics to 
accept changes are being met with correspondent 
obligations for government and companies
1
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Energy system change bears upon multiple long-term 
national policy goals, including the transition to a low 
carbon economy, energy security and affordability, and 
mitigating wider environmental impacts. Significant 
interrelated transformations in the way the UK supplies, 
manages and consumes its energy will be essential if these 
aims are to be attained (Ekins et al., 2013; Department 
of Energy and Climate Change, DECC, 2011a). This 
major process of transformation entails considerable 
uncertainties and contingencies. One aspect of change 
about which there are wide-ranging uncertainties is that 
of public perspectives and engagement. Public values, 
attitudes and acceptability will be of critical importance in 
processes of whole energy systems transformation, with 
the potential to present both opportunities and challenges 
for the delivery of energy policy and change across 
multiple areas. 
Though there is existing research evidence pertaining to 
public attitudes toward single aspects of energy system 
transformation (e.g. nuclear energy, behaviour change), 
there is little understanding of public responses to  
whole-system transformations. The research presented 
here begins to fill this evidence gap, reporting findings 
from one stage of a programme of novel empirical research 
that delivers insights into what the public think about 
whole energy system change. 
At the outset it is important to draw a distinction between 
research that engages with questions of how public(s) 
are likely to respond to transitions or techno-scientific 
developments, which are enacted or initiated in the main 
by others (e.g. government, energy companies, scientists), 
and those that seek to understand why public(s) do 
or do not themselves enact changes in lifestyles and 
actions toward more sustainable ends. This first area of 
interest can be seen as related to debates about public 
participation and the importance of characterising diverse 
forms of concern that pertain to various socio-technical 
developments (e.g. see Macnaghten, 2010).
The latter set of questions, by contrast, arise out of 
divergent social science research traditions that are 
concerned more with issues regarding the factors or 
complex processes that shape, shift and stabilise actions 
with consequences for sustainability (e.g. see Nye, 
Whitmarsh, Foxon, 2010; Shove, 2010; Shove, Pantzar and 
Watson, 2012). The research reported here is primarily 
situated in the first area of research, aiming to build 
insights that contribute to a characterisation of public 
concerns pertaining to envisioned future energy systems. 
It does, however, also deliver some findings that pertain to 
the latter area, for instance, in offering explanatory power 
for understanding elements of inaction. The focus, then, 
is not primarily on how to engage public(s) in undertaking 
transitional actions themselves but on how they view 
proposed changes, which have major implications for 
their own lives and lifestyles. 
This report provides a summary of the findings arising 
from work package 2 of the wider project, for which in-
depth deliberative workshops were held with members 
of the public from across the UK. The goal of this phase 
of the research was not to attain a representative picture 
of public opinion. Rather, we aimed to draw out the types 
of issues and concerns which emerge across a diverse 
sample of people. In this regard, the deliberative approach 
allows us to develop insights regarding not only the 
different kinds of issues that members of the public raise, 
but crucially, the conditions, values and concerns that 
underlay and help to explain views on different aspects  
of change. Here we report our findings organised around 
10 interrelated themes created through an analytic 
process that was data driven. These themes are set out on 
the contents page. They offer a way of ordering or making 
sense of the data, and represent areas of public discourse 
about system change that were identified as most 
important through the analysis, both in terms of their 
prevalence in the discussions and their relevance  
for contemporary debates. 
We aimed to draw out the 
types of issues and concerns 
which emerge across a 
diverse sample of people.
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1.1. Research Objectives 
Transforming the UK Energy System: Public Values, 
Attitudes and Acceptability aims to contribute a rigorous 
and systematic picture of public values and acceptability 
with regard to energy system change. The project as a 
whole has overarching research objectives to be fulfilled 
by three interlinked work packages outlined in the boxes.
The objectives of the work package 2 Public Deliberative 
Workshops are to:
• Highlight key points of agreement and contestation 
regarding tradeoffs including the conditions of 
acceptance relating to different energy systems 
scenarios. 
• Reveal the values which underpin people’s decisions 
and attitudes towards whole energy system change 
scenarios.
• Develop insight into public perspectives on everyday 
lifestyle changes implicated in different energy system 
scenarios, both in terms of demand side and supply 
side changes.
• Generate a major qualitative data-set giving insight into 
the processes of preference construction about energy 
system transformation. 
• Before outlining the methods used for Work Package 2, 
we give a brief discussion of the literature and set out 
the background for this work.
 
1.2  Research Background: Technology, Public 
Engagement and Social Contracts
What is lacking is not just knowledge to fill the gaps but also 
processes and methods to elicit what the public wants, and to 
use what is already known. To bring these dimensions out of 
the shadows and into the dynamics of democratic debate, they 
must first be made concrete and tangible. Scattered and private 
knowledge has to be amalgamated, perhaps even disciplined, 
into a dependable civic epistemology. (Jasanoff, 2003 p. 240) 
The core aims of this work package centre on developing 
understanding of public values, characterisations 
and acceptability, paying particular attention to what 
underpins views and the conditionality attached to 
expressed preferences. The goal therefore is to contribute 
to an amalgamation of the kinds of ‘private knowledge’ 
that Jasanoff refers to in the quote above. This notion of 
private knowledge, as an important but often neglected 
dimension of democratic debate, emerges from a long 
history of research and analysis concerned with the 
relations between science, technology and publics. 
Introduction
Research Objectives of Transforming the  
UK’s Energy System
1. Identify the degrees of public acceptability of 
whole energy system transformation, in particular 
identifying important trade-offs
2. Build knowledge and understanding of public 
attitudes, values and acceptability in order to 
support development of sustainable transitions in 
the energy sector
3. Create qualitative and quantitative data sets for 
examination of the perspectives of varied publics 
across the UK on whole energy system transitions 
4. Develop and utilise innovative methodological 
approaches for examining public values, attitudes 
and acceptability
Transforming the UK Energy System:  
Public Values, Attitudes and Acceptability – 
Project Work Packages
WP 3: Demski, Spence, Pidgeon & 
Whitmarsh
Innovative national survey on whole energy system 
transformations
WP 2: Butler, Parkhill & Pidgeon
Deliberating Energy System Scenarios and Trade-offs
WP 1: All Parties
Scenario Adaptation, Expert Consultation and 
Material Development.
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In essence such work engages with a concern that the 
technocratic and highly specialised nature of scientific 
and technological decision-making is at odds with the 
principles and dynamics of democracy. From this central 
point, a wide-ranging literature has examined the cultural 
contingencies of scientific knowledge and sought to value 
different kinds of knowledge framed within other cultural 
assumptions, meanings and life-worlds (e.g. Leach, 
Scoones and Wynne, 2005). One important consequence 
of this pursuit is the emergence of public participatory 
research – a form of research which seeks to engage (and 
represent) public perspectives, knowledges and concerns 
in relation to a wide range of present and emerging 
techno-scientific issues. 
Such research is underpinned by a fundamental 
questioning of ‘the well-entrenched linear model of 
science communication and its embedded values’ 
(Felt and Fochler, 2010, p. 220), and critical engagement 
with modes of deficit thinking within decision-making 
processes. This research tradition has sought to open up 
alternative possibilities for engendering improved quality 
of decisions. Wynne (1992), in particular, has highlighted 
the significance of expanding the sources of legitimate 
knowledge and recognising the value and importance of 
lay knowledge (Wynne, 1992; 1993; also see Fiorino, 1990; 
Pidgeon, 1998). 
Jasanoff suggests that what is needed is a move away 
from positions that privilege science as the authority on 
mapping out future impacts and development trajectories, 
toward inclusion of those, which ‘would engage the 
human subject as an active, imaginative agent, as well as 
a source of knowledge, insight, and memory’ (2003: 243). 
In this regard she argues that such a shift would allow 
for ‘plural viewpoints and collective learning’ (Jasanoff, 
2003, p. 240) – a kind of ‘co-intelligence’ (Hartz-Karp, 
2007, p. 2). For this report we wish to situate the analysis 
with reference to these ideas and concepts. We thus aim 
to bring into view plural viewpoints on future energy 
systems and their possible (re)configurations with a view 
to developing the knowledge base for decision-making  
in this area. 
Public Engagement: Challenges and Debates 
A number of key challenges have been identified in 
relation to the development of research which aims to 
highlight different viewpoints and perspectives. First, 
critical attention has been given to how publics form 
their views and develop their knowledges, particularly in 
relation to issues that do not have immediate or obvious 
salience for everyday life (e.g. see Zaller, 1992). In this 
respect, there has been concern about the role of media 
and vocal public figures in shaping the perspectives of 
wider publics. 
Though the media clearly have an impact and represent 
an important source of information, the extent of this 
impact is tempered by the now widely recognised 
understanding that people do not passively receive 
information from media and other sources but are 
interactive in their role (e.g. see Bucchi, 1998; Allan, 
2002; Butler and Pidgeon, 2009). For example, we know 
that people selectively read and pay attention to media 
that confirms their existing views or corresponds with 
existing values. This means that while the ways that 
issues are reported and framed in wider public discourse 
are undoubtedly important, they are certainly not all 
encompassing (see Gamson and Modigliani, 1989).
This line of argument brings us to the significance of 
value positions, world views, anchoring, and interpretative 
frames (e.g. see Moscovici, 1984; Douglas, 1992; Wynne, 
1996; Jasanoff and Wynne, 1998; Miller, 2000). These 
concepts, in quite distinct ways, describe how we make 
sense of the world around us in relation to existing 
values, sets of ideas, positions or feelings. They refer to 
the ways that people translate observations about the 
world in relation to their particular values and frames, 
connecting the things they see happening with the kind 
of happenings they would like to see (Miller 2000). One 
consequence of this insight is the understanding that 
new information does not act to fill blank holes; rather it 
is incorporated within and in relation to existing frames. 
Significantly, this means that though opinions may appear 
superficial and amenable to change with every new frame 
or piece of information, they can often be quite deep-
seated and anchored in strongly held pre-existing cultural 
values and knowledges. This takes us to our second core 
challenge – the future oriented nature of the issues that 
are the focus of this research. 
In unpacking this dimension of public engagement, 
a related line of research dedicated to what has been 
termed ‘upstream engagement’ (e.g. see Pidgeon 
and Rogers-Hayden, 2007) provides a useful point of 
departure. This body of work has focused on new and 
Jasanoff suggests that what is 
needed is a move away from 
positions that privilege science 
as the authority on mapping out 
future impacts and development 
trajectories, toward inclusion 
of those, which ‘would engage 
the human subject as an 
active, imaginative agent, as 
well as a source of knowledge, 
insight, and memory’.
emerging technologies that often only exist ‘in terms of 
future-oriented promise rather than as material reality’ 
(Macnaghten, 2010, p. 24). Though the research reported 
here is not focused on “upstream” technologies per se, it 
raises some similar issues that the upstream engagement 
literature addresses. First, the purpose of future oriented 
engagement work has been given attention. 
For example, Stirling argues that upstream engagement 
should not be pursued as a means for ‘legitimising 
technological choices’, nor should it be a method for 
‘closing down’ public contestation (Stirling, 2007). 
Instead, he suggests that ‘the truly innovative potential 
for “upstream engagement” lies in “opening up” broader 
attention to the full range of potentially viable choices’ 
(Stirling, 2007, p. 293). 
Second, issues have been identified in engaging publics 
with the “not yet” and “accessing” futures. In this regard, 
research has shown that with careful critical reflection 
on both the aims of engagement and ways to promote 
‘meaningful interaction’ with interested parties (Jasanoff, 
2003, p. 238), opportunities can be created whereby publics 
feel enabled to take part in discussions ‘offer opinions, 
discuss the issues, and reflect on future politics and 
their contingencies’ across technical and socio-cultural 
dimensions (Macnaghten, 2010, p. 24). We contend 
therefore that publics, as ‘scientific citizens’ (Irwin, 1995), 
are able to critically reflect on the claims put forward 
regarding processes of socio-technical change and the 
particular technologies that such transitions encompass. 
Social contracts, Public Engagement  
and Energy System Change
The scale of the challenge in transforming the UK’s energy 
system is one that necessarily involves some level of 
engagement between state and civil society. That is to 
say, that without the active involvement of both state and 
wider public(s) it is difficult to envision transitions of the 
kinds necessary to address contemporary energy related 
issues. In this context, the concept of ‘social contracts’ has 
gained increasing appeal as a way of understanding the 
role of reciprocal rights, responsibilities and obligations 
between state and civil society and what changes to these 
might be implied in transitions (e.g. see O’Brien, Hayward 
and Berkes, 2009). In sustainability debates we find 
increasing interest in the notion of creating a new social 
contract for change (e.g. see German Advisory Council on 
Global Change, 2011). 
The concept of social contracts originates in the 
philosophy of Kant but has found form in a number of 
different writers over many years (e.g. Kant, 1959; Rawls, 
1971; Rousseau, 1973). It has been used both to explain 
what appears as a consenting relationship between 
state and society, and, in a more normative sense, to 
inform the development of modern democratic states. 
At its core it relates, then, to the ideal of ‘government by 
consent’ and to some form of agreement as to the rights, 
responsibilities, duties and obligations of civil populations 
and the state. For example, citizens explicitly or implicitly 
accept obligations or responsibilities, such as working 
and paying taxes, and in turn the state offers benefits like 
education or health services, and protection, for example 
of civil liberties. 
Such agreements are of course not neutral and in some 
formulations of the concept ‘social contract’ theory has 
been argued to obscure the significance of power relations 
and the differential possibilities for consent. Indeed, the 
notion that lack of active protest or apparent acquiescence 
amounts to consent has been heavily critiqued. Equally, 
that social contracts are continually contested and 
challenged has been highlighted as indicative of the 
problematic nature of ideas of consent and agreement.
As social contracts have evolved so too has the 
role of private businesses in taking up aspects of 
provision (energy being a good example) but without 
the corresponding formal responsibilities embedded 
within relations between state and citizens. Indeed, the 
advanced liberal state is one that, arguably, works to shift 
responsibility onto private citizens and corporations 
(see Miller and Rose, 2008). The changing role of the 
corporation within social contracts is thus important and 
must form part of the thinking about their transformation. 
With these critical assessments embedded, the notion 
of social contracts can form a useful tool for thinking 
through the relations of responsibility between state, 
wider society and (increasingly) corporations, and 
how these might need to change in processes of 
transition. Crucial to this thinking is a recognition that 
transformations of the energy system are likely to 
intersect with existing social contracts and that change 
affecting one side of a contract must necessarily take in 
consideration of the other side. Through this report the 
concept of social contracts forms an analytic lens for 
exploring multiple aspects of transition. The analysis 
draws out what energy system change of the kinds 
envisioned might mean for the (re)creation of new 
relations of responsibility between state, citizens and 
companies. 
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This research employed an 
innovative deliberative workshop 
design to engage members of 
the public from across the UK 
in reflection on energy system 
transitions. 
2.1. Sampling and Locations 
Deliberative workshops were undertaken in London, 
Cardiff and Edinburgh and three other sites selected for 
their specific characteristics with regard to energy and 
ways of living. These were Cumbria as the site of Sellafield 
nuclear facilities, Merthyr Tydfil as an area with a long 
history of coal, as well as recent contestation around 
new energy infrastructure (e.g. waste incinerators, wind, 
open cast mining), and Glasgow with sampling from 
settlements near to Whitelee onshore wind farm  
(see Figure 1). For all of these sites with particular  
London
Cardiff
Merthyr Tydfil
Sellafield
Glasgow
Edinburgh
energy infrastructures in their vicinity we further specified 
sampling from rural locations. 
The workshops were designed as a one day format with 
11-12 participants in each group (total participant n=68). In 
addition to sampling from very different locations across 
the UK, participants were sampled to ensure a diverse 
mix of gender, age, ethnicity, socio-economic grouping, 
household tenure (denoted as of particular importance 
with regard to views on household level transitions), and 
educational qualifications. The process of sampling for 
qualitative research of this kind involves a core aim to 
ensure that a diverse set of perspectives are represented. 
To achieve this, the research builds from the theoretical 
proposition that differential characteristics (such as 
age, where you live etc.) will be linked to different 
kinds of life experience. In turn, different forms of life 
experience are expected to result in the emergence 
of varying perspectives, values, worldviews and 
standpoints. This is not to suggest that there will be 
homogeneity in the perspectives of those that share 
similar characteristics, rather it is to anticipate diversity 
emerging from differences. In sampling across a range of 
social characteristics, then, we can expect a diverse set of 
views and perspectives. As such, the presence of themes 
in discourse across such diverse perspectives can be 
regarded as indicative of broader public concerns. 
2.2. Approach and Design Innovation 
Three pilot workshops were undertaken to develop 
and refine the design and approach. The final design 
is informed by the outcomes of the piloting and 
extensive team discussions, as well as consultation with 
stakeholders and experts in energy system change. For 
the first part of the workshops the research team gave 
presentations and facilitated participants in large group 
discussions on the key policy issues underlying thought 
about whole energy system change (e.g. infrastructure 
renewal, climate change, energy security, affordability), as 
well as the meaning of ‘whole energy system change’, and 
the purpose of scenarios. The research team described 
whole energy system change as encompassing all aspects 
of technical infrastructure (e.g. different forms of supply, 
grid and network infrastructure), demand infrastructure 
(e.g. change to houses, transport infrastructure and so 
forth), and social elements (e.g. changes to ways we live 
our lives, policies and governance). The definition thus 
included both technical and socio-cultural aspects of 
energy systems. 
The presentations and the other informative materials 
used during the workshops were informed by earlier 
work undertaken in Work Package 1. This work package 
involved expert interviewing, review work, and 
collaboration with project partners that brought expertise 
in engineering and energy system transitions (i.e. Cardiff 
University Schools of Engineering and Architecture – see 
Figure 1. Map of locations 
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acknowledgements), to build a picture of current expert 
understanding of energy system change. The information 
gathered through this process was utilised to ensure 
accuracy in the informative materials, presentations, and 
protocols used in the workshops. 
Following initial presentations and whole group 
discussions, participants were divided into two smaller 
groups of five-six. Each smaller group was then guided 
through a structured discussion designed to prompt 
deliberation as participants collectively created their own 
energy system scenarios using a scenario building tool – 
My2050 (see Figure 2). 
The scenario tool represents a simplified version of a 
detailed scenario calculator (see the Department of Energy 
and Climate Change 2050 Calculator) that shows the 
impact of different system changes on carbon emissions 
targets and energy security aims. This encompasses both 
supply and demand side changes but does not cover all 
aspects of plausible transitions currently imagined. The 
workshop discussion thus included prompts on aspects of 
system change not encompassed in the scenario tool. This 
allowed an opportunity to achieve a sense of public views 
on forms of system change deemed important by wider 
sets of stakeholders. 
Participants were also given additional information to 
that provided within the scenario tool to facilitate their 
engagement with and understanding of the various 
aspects of system change. One example is information 
pertaining to the number of homes in the UK now and 
the number anticipated in 2050 – this gave participants an 
understanding of the retrofit agenda (as opposed to just 
focusing on new builds) with regard to energy efficiency. 
The final aspect of the workshops involved participants in 
discussion of ‘scenario narratives’ created specifically for 
this research and designed to reflect three plausible future 
energy system scenarios. The first narrative reflected a 
“do nothing” scenario and depicted continuing reliance 
on fossil fuels along with associated impacts relating to 
climate change and energy security. The second narrative 
involved a highly technological response to energy 
issues depicting use of technologies like Carbon Capture 
and Storage (CCS) and nuclear energy along with some 
renewable energy deployment and a small amount of 
change on the demand side. The third and final narrative 
centred on high levels of renewable deployment and 
correspondingly higher levels of change to the demand 
side. These were written from the perspective of the first 
person and were intended to generate a greater sense of 
the implications of energy system change for everyday 
life (see appendix). The narratives were developed from a 
range of scenario sources and from information attained 
through interviews with expert sources. 
2.3 Analysis 
All discussions were recorded and transcribed verbatim 
by a professional transcription company. Transcripts 
were subsequently rechecked against recordings to 
ensure accuracy. Transcripts were then uploaded to a 
computer programme for qualitative data analysis (Nvivo). 
This computer package facilitates management and 
organisation of data into codes. Codes take the form of 
analytic themes arising from the data or alternatively 
represent “ordering” codes (e.g. all talk about heating was 
coded to a file on heat). Once coded the resulting data 
files contain all parts of the discussion pertaining to the 
particular aspect of interest. These are then read and  
re-read and treated to several iterations of sense making. 
For this process the key messages that arise from the  
code in terms of public views are extrapolated and then 
re-examined against the data to ensure they reflect the 
data. This process is iterative and continues until the 
analyst is confident in their assertions. 
It is possible to ask multiple different questions of data in 
the analytic process. The questions that have been asked 
for the analysis reported here are not exhaustive but were 
derived from academic literature, policy consultation, 
expert interviews and through input from our advisory 
panel (see appendix). Additionally, emergent concerns that 
arose through discussion and appeared as particularly 
salient for members of the public were treated to analytic 
scrutiny. It is important to highlight that this form of 
research and analysis allows for insights into the values 
and concerns that underlay expressed preferences. 
 
Figure 2. My2050 Scenario Tool 
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In writing this report a process of further analytic 
refinement was undertaken whereby different lenses  
(e.g. social contracts) were applied to the data to generate 
a set of useful and important insights with regard to 
public characterisations of whole energy system change. 
In the following, the findings are reported through ten 
cross-cutting analytic themes intended to give insight into 
the breadth of public understandings obtained through 
this in-depth research. The creation of the themes was 
data driven but they also represent areas of particular 
relevance for contemporary debates about energy  
system change. 
It is important to note that the data quotes provided 
throughout the report are illustrative and represent 
examples of the kind of discussion prevalent in the 
workshops from which the wider points are drawn. The 
selected quotes have been taken from across all of the 
groups and across the full range of participants
The report is structured around the following ten themes:
Theme 1 Meta-Issues: Climate Change and Energy Security 
Theme 2 Imagining Energy System Change 
Theme 3 Affordability, Responsibility and Trust for Energy System Transitions 
Theme 4 Uncertainty, Risk Making and Risk Taking
Theme 5 Socio-technical Change, Non-transitions and Pessimism
Theme 6 Energy Matters in Place: Politics, In(action) and Control
Theme 7 Accessing Energy Futures: Challenges and Opportunities
Theme 8 Workers and Jobs in Energy System Transitions
Theme 9 Governance Policies and Strategy in Public View
Theme 10 System Links: Making Connections?
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T1. Meta-Issues: Climate Change and  
Energy Security
Concerns about climate change and energy security 
underpin policy debates about energy system change 
and as such public views about these issues are of key 
interest. There is a wide ranging literature that addresses 
public engagement with climate change (e.g. Zehr, 2000; 
Lorenzoni and Pidgeon, 2006; Butler, 2010; Spence et al., 
2010a; Whitmarsh, et al., 2011; Wolf and Moser, 2011)  
along with a developing literature on energy security  
(e.g. Demski, 2011; Corner et al. 2011). The analysis in  
this first theme examines our key findings with regard  
to how public(s) engaged with these issues, focusing 
particularly on the points of connect or disconnect 
between views on these concerns and attitudes toward 
energy system change. 
To begin with climate change, the findings are consistent 
with previous work in this area showing a wide range 
of public responses, from different forms of scepticism 
(see Poortinga et al., 2011) to high levels of concern. For 
our participants, ‘carbon’ or ‘low carbon’ as ways of 
characterising different aspects of the energy system 
(e.g. fossil fuels, renewable energy) were not particularly 
salient terms but that is not to say that they are not 
salient in a more general sense. Members of the public in 
our groups tended to relate ideas of carbon through more 
general notions of cleanliness and pollution. These thus 
offer public frames through which carbon emissions are 
interpreted; that is, emissions are understood to be bad 
even if the specifics of the science is not known. 
Notably, concern about climate change was heightened 
for many participants when a narrative scenario that 
introduced some potential effects of climate change 
for the UK was introduced (see appendix). In particular, 
participants that had expressed sceptical viewpoints 
earlier in the day, voiced concerns during the discussion 
of the narrative that had hitherto not been mentioned. 
Below are illustrative examples of the types of responses 
the narrative provoked.
M: What about you? Has it made you reflect on any  
of the things we’ve discussed today?
P1: Well as I said, I’m, my old fashioned way has come 
back to it anyway but, and I suppose that doesn’t help 
this scenario but I mean, I can see the point in, it makes 
you think twice when you think, look at grandchildren, 
you know… it does make you think about, you know, 
what you are doing to your environment… 
M: Yeah okay, and you...?
P2: It is definitely an eye opener because I’d 
probably agree but I would say my two grandweans 
[grandchildren] it’s being, you hear and you’re reading, 
and all these things are happening and, it is a worry, 
definitely a worry. (Glasgow)
P1: I didn’t like any of it
P2: It’s a bit frightening isn’t it?
P3: I think it is a bit frightening, yeah.
P4: It’s business as usual
P5: It is as everyone says quite frightening and something 
we need to sort out. (London) 
 
This is suggestive of the potential for climate change 
concern to increase when the impacts are made more 
visible or salient (see also Spence et al. 2011). 
Centrally, we found views on climate change did not 
translate straight forwardly into views on the various 
aspects of energy system change. For example, scepticism 
about climate change did not prevent engagement with 
mitigation policies and practices. 
P: I’m not overly concerned [laughter] mainly because  
I watch a lot of programmes on it and everyone says  
there are major concerns with climate change, but there 
are a lot of programmes which say that historically 
climates have changed anyway.
[LATER]
M: So I guess how would you feel about having a carbon 
tax on goods then?
P: That would be fuel tax isn’t it? Tax on fuel, or import 
tax on fuel the more fuel you’d use the more you pay. I 
certainly agree with that. (Cardiff) 
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Such apparent disconnects are indicative of discourse 
about climate change science, in particular, as occupying a 
separate discursive space – one that is quite distinct from 
discourse about the multiple aspects of energy system 
transition. This means that on the one hand sceptical 
discourses regarding the science of climate change do not 
automatically translate into negative views on aspects 
of change for mitigation, while on the other hand, strong 
acceptance of climate science and deep concern equally 
do not necessarily translate into positive views on such 
forms of change. This is perhaps not surprising given 
previous analysis which has pointed to the importance of 
values as significant in determining views regarding what 
(if anything) should be done, over and above knowledge 
about the specifics of climate change science (Thompson 
and Rayner, 1998).
Energy security as a term was not salient to people but the 
range of concerns that it encompasses (e.g. geopolitical 
issues, energy shortages, black outs, unaffordable prices) 
did evoke strong reactions (see also Demski, 2011). Though 
our public’s discourse encompassed concerns about 
national level security and supplies of fossil fuels, there 
was a much stronger focus on the services that energy 
supports and personal access to energy. This manifested 
in a number of different ways – one of which saw energy 
security issues reformulated in terms of ensuring a kind 
of personal level security by having diverse forms of 
energy within the home or (to a lesser extent) in personal 
transport. 
P: I think it’s nice to have a little flexibility. If you have 
got an open grate somewhere - and in the future we may 
have to consider that the electric might go off more often 
- then [with] central heating systems which are powered 
by electric, no matter what you use as the other fuel, you 
have got no heating anyway so unless you have a little 
grate where you can chop up some logs or have a supply 
of something for emergencies, you are going to freeze, and 
it’s nice to have that versatility of belt and braces or belt, 
braces and something else as well. (Cumbria) 
 
This type of discourse tended to arise from participants 
that lived in rural areas and experienced power cuts 
more regularly than those living in urban settlements. 
There was, however, a corresponding narrative within 
city dweller’s talk about energy security, wherein they 
positioned themselves as vulnerable in the sense of having 
little control over ‘shocks’ to their energy supply, such as 
power cuts or blackouts (on energy security ‘shocks’ see 
Smith and Stirling, 2010). 
A further way in which energy security was located at 
the personal level arose through discussion of energy 
affordability. We found that the notion of energy becoming 
unaffordable evoked considerable concern amongst 
participants – this is indicative of the close links between 
cost, affordability and energy security that arose in our 
participant’s discourse. 
P: …the thing I would be more concerned with would be 
the electricity becoming unaffordable because we rely on 
it a lot and of course [other participant] was saying that it 
is going to be a bit frightening for the younger generation, 
because we rely on it. We don’t really think about the 
terrorist attacks and all that kind of stuff, because we’re 
not, we are not aware of it… we don’t pay much attention 
as to how it will affect us, we rather want electricity there. 
(Glasgow) 
 
Affordability as a dimension of energy security forms a 
significant part of official definitions as well as featuring 
strongly within academic characterisations of the issue 
(for discussion see Chester, 2010). As Chester (2010, p. 891) 
points out, however, ‘affordability, or the ‘reasonableness’ 
of prices, are relative notions with meanings subject 
to considerable variation’. While in official definitions 
absolute notions of market supply and market price 
dominate, in public conceptions affordability is a more 
relative notion that incorporates concern about inequality 
and injustice. Discourse about affordability is discussed 
in more detail in Theme 3, for now the point to be made 
is that public discourse about energy security is closely 
connected with concern about energy affordability. 
Where discourse about energy security as a national 
concern arose, issues related to insecurity of fossil fuel 
supplies were bound up with negative attitudes toward 
these forms of fuel in a more general sense (see Theme 
5). This meant that geopolitical issues relating to securing 
supplies of fossil fuels represented just one in a wider 
range of problems that were seen as related to fossil fuel 
dependency. 
At a general level, supply of energy was largely viewed as 
a social good (see Stern and Aronson, 1984). In this sense, 
the expectation that supplies of energy would remain 
affordable and that access to services reliant on energy 
(car driving, lighting etc.) would be largely uninterrupted, 
or at least quickly restored, formed an important part 
of existing ‘social contracts’ – i.e. the mutual consent 
between civil society and the state (see introduction for  
a more detailed discussion of social contracts). 
In terms of the connections between energy security 
concerns and views on various aspects on energy 
system change again the connections were not linear. 
For example, energy security – when linked to energy 
affordability – did not translate straightforwardly into 
rejection of more expensive routes to change. This is 
understandable when we take into account the ways that 
costs for energy system transitions were positioned in our 
participant’s discourse, i.e. as a shared responsibility that 
should not fall in the main to consumers (see Theme 3  
for detailed discussion). 
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In this section we have introduced the core findings 
relating to the ways that energy security and climate 
change were perceived by our participants. In particular, 
we have highlighted how concern or lack thereof with 
regard to these issues does not translate straightforwardly 
into perspectives on energy system change. These findings 
offer explanatory power in terms of understanding 
outcomes of quantitative research which indicate there 
are no simple connections between views on meta-
issues and views on energy system development (e.g. see 
Pidgeon et al., 2008; Spence et al., 2010a; Corner et al., 
2011; Shuckburgh et al., 2012; Poortinga, et al. 2012). The 
findings presented here thus point to the importance of 
recognising that public acceptability is complex and is 
influenced by multiple factors in combination with one 
another, rather than being linearly influenced by views on 
one issue in particular.
Though perceptions of climate change and 
energy security are important, we found that the 
acceptability of different aspects of energy system 
transition was mediated by a wide range of other 
considerations. This means there are not straight-
forward relationships between concern about these 
issues and views on the acceptability of energy 
system changes. As such, while climate change and 
energy security are important as meta-narratives 
underpinning reasons for change, they may be less 
significant than one might expect in determining 
views on system transformation.
T2: Imagining Energy System Change
An important set of questions arises for this research 
project around how public(s) view processes of and 
possibilities for change within energy systems. For this 
theme the focus is on the ways that public(s) engaged 
with change in a wider sense, rather than in reference 
to more tightly defined elements of energy systems 
or specific technological options. The section explores 
different dimensions of change including at this more 
abstract level, what is desired, how it can be encouraged, 
when and how it can be engendered, and elements of 
responsibility.
Collectively we are often guilty of talking about change 
and transition as if it is a novel process. We sometimes 
talk as though we are moving from one fixed state to 
another. Whilst low carbon transitions do tend to coalesce 
around particular ways of doing that are novel, clearly 
transformation in and of itself is not a socio-cultural 
artefact belonging solely to contemporary societies. This 
recognition of change as an ongoing process was evident 
within our participant’s discourse. Indeed, the inevitability 
of change was an ever present underlying assumption 
that connects in important ways with the formulation of 
views on different aspects of envisioned transitions (see 
Theme 3 for an illustration regarding change assumptions 
about cost). 
This sense of the inevitability of change is different, 
however, to the desire for particular forms of change, 
especially things that might be regarded as more 
disruptive. In this regard, what is so striking from the 
research is the enthusiasm our participants had for 
addressing contemporary problems by doing things 
differently. Not just the means by which we produce 
and use energy, but also with regards to the ideals and 
motivations that underpin the ways we live our lives. That 
is not to say that change was unproblematic, for example 
at times our participants struggled to imagine change, 
or more precisely how it might manifest (also Theme 7). 
The general desire for change was matched by an equally 
strong concern about the consequences of doing nothing. 
P: I’m sure we would have done something about it in 
40 years. It is a depressing thought that we are going to 
continue with the way we are without doing any changes. 
(London) 
 
The enthusiasm for change centred on the desire for what 
might broadly be termed a “sustainable” energy system. 
This notion of a sustainable system encompasses at 
the core ideas, experiences or things that people value 
and would like to see within future energy systems. 
These include naturalness, cleanliness, healthiness, 
the infinite nature of something (in terms of resources), 
but also things that do not generate conflicts/wars, or 
involve “waste”. These more abstract aspects of value 
were attached to particular technologies and processes 
within energy system change, such as renewable forms of 
energy production and efficiency. Indeed, renewable forms 
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of production were particularly desired and are notable 
as forming a central part of our participants’ visions 
of sustainable energy systems. The ways that people 
envisioned transitions to systems of renewable energy was 
not idealistic but rooted in a sense of pragmatism about 
the scale of change. For many it represented a long-term 
future that should be the focus of efforts with regard to 
energy system transitions. 
P: Well all the installation of the electric and solar panels, 
the bio fields, it is not going to happen overnight, all of this 
is gradually going to come into our lives, but it is a really 
good vision. (Cardiff) 
 
The desire for renewable forms of production was also 
connected with more negative views about fossil fuels. 
P: …when you hear the people with the doomsday theory 
that it’s [fossil fuels] going to run out and we have nothing 
left, that would be a worry in the back of my head, 
because I know that I’ll have to deal with it at some point, 
and I know that my kids will definitely have to deal with 
it…that’s how I prefer the renewable forms, knowing that 
it’s always going to be there. (Glasgow) 
 
Of course, what the quote above also reveals is how 
renewable forms of energy are able to potentially attenuate 
fears surrounding issues related to depletion of energy 
sources. Important in this regard, is that when questions 
were posed to participants about unconventional fossil 
fuels and the possibility that they may not run out soon, 
this did not allay concerns. Instead the underlying issue 
was that fossil fuels are finite and thus will inevitably run 
out at some point (even if in the long term future). 
Though there was a strong desire to move away from 
fossil fuel-based systems, this was also juxtaposed with 
discourse about the desirability of fossil fuel-based heating 
sources. For example, the efficacy and controllability 
of gas central heating systems, or the forms of sensory 
experience produced by gas and coal fires (see Themes 6 
and 7 for a fuller discussion of the reasons underpinning 
this juxtaposition).
P: I love my coal fire, especially when it is pouring down 
rain outside and you come in and you have go your 
candles on and your lamps on and you’ve got a coal fire, 
there is nothing better. (Glasgow) 
 
Our participants did not rest at just advocating renewable 
forms of production and expressing preferences for 
reductions in fossil fuels. Many of our participants 
recognised that current regimes of accumulation (i.e. our 
high consumption-based economy) sat in counterpoint 
to sustainable ways of living, and as such a move to a 
sustainable energy system.
P: I don’t want to sound like an old hippy but if you go 
producing more and more and more you just have more 
and more rubbish, and more and more environmental 
problems, but our system, our economy is based on 
producing so that is a real problem, unless we produce 
things that aren’t environmentally detrimental, but that 
would mean you would have to change the way people 
think. (London) 
 
Clearly such sentiments are outlining the not-insignificant 
challenges ahead in transitioning to a low(er) carbon 
society. This type of talk also highlights, however, the 
awareness amongst publics of the need for change to 
go beyond technological innovation in the ways that we 
produce and use energy. Instead, there was awareness 
that for a successful transformation we must challenge 
our ways of living in a more fundamental sense. 
P1: If we were only judging on the insulation, but there 
are so many social things I’d find that almost...I can’t 
make a call on that [reducing household temperature]
P2: Yeah the social aspect side of it is…
M: What are you referring to?
P1: Well as I was saying, if you’re looking to 2050, 
another 40 years down the line, all the people that we 
were saying, like all our grannies and us older ones that 
make do and put on jumpers, that’s gone and people are 
not used to thinking outside the, you know, the warm 
box… And also we’re such a big consumer society that 
you’ve got more stores with more refrigeration units, 
more things with short lives, and planned obsolescence… 
(Merthyr) 
 
For some, a move to a lower carbon society meant, 
in some senses, going backwards to a “simpler” time. 
Interestingly, though notions of going backward at times 
held negative connotations, this was not necessarily 
always the case.
M: When you say it’s like looking back on how we used to 
live, is that a good or bad thing?
P: I suppose it’s a good thing because…when you look at 
your parents, and they lived a great life, if that’s the way 
they used to live, and they were watching everything, 
watching the energy, watching the money and all that so, I 
think it would be a good thing. (Glasgow)
Important is that when  
questions were posed 
to participants about 
unconventional fossil fuels 
and the possibility that they 
may not run out soon, this 
did not allay concerns.
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Whist our participants were aware that large changes 
were important, there was also particular support and 
desire for little changes, in both attitudes and ways of 
doing. In this regard, though participants recognised that 
little changes were no substitute for the larger ones, to 
ignore smaller changes was highly problematic. 
P: It is the same as hospitals, they always have the 
heating on, it is such little changes, how difficult can it be 
for some utility man or boiler man in a hospital to think 
we don’t need the heating on today let’s turn it off. It is 
the same, public buildings, schools, they always have the 
heating raging…What a complete and utter waste, little 
changes are needed…If people took it from the ground up 
as it were and we started making small changes, it would 
push companies into making those changes… (Cardiff) 
 
The types of things characterised as smaller changes 
were often those where the action was viewed as 
being located at a distance from government (e.g. in 
this example heating controls of particular buildings). 
Importantly for policy makers and other stakeholders 
we found that to favour larger changes without also 
engaging and facilitating engagement with “smaller” ones, 
risks engendering feelings of frustration and ultimately 
disengagement with processes of change. Core in this 
regard is that change is experienced within daily life and 
that (in)action can be seen “on the ground” (see Wynne 
1996, on body language). This relates to a further finding 
indicated by the latter part of the above quote – that is, the 
importance placed on generating momentum for change. 
Our participants envisioned that making small changes 
could not only have a cumulatively large impact in and 
of itself, but would also provide the impetus for making 
larger changes; i.e. change stimulates more change. Those 
participants who tried to suggest there was little they 
could do as individuals or that small changes were not 
meaningful were met with fierce resistance. 
P1: That’s part of my stumbling block. I could make so 
little difference by myself, in a sense, why should I bother?
P2: If we all thought that way…I’m not saying everyone 
will get on board, but I’m just saying if we all have the 
same attitude, nothing will get achieved, nothing will get 
changed. So one small change could snowball and make 
things a lot better for our future generations. (Cumbria) 
 
Although there was a clear appetite for change, not all 
of our participants understood or necessarily felt it was 
something they would have to deal with – change was 
located in a distant future time or as something “others” 
would enact. In this regard, it was recognised that gaining 
consensus for action was unlikely to ever occur – some 
parties would always resist making a change even with 
the strongest encouragement. Rather than seeing this as 
a means to derail transitions, it was consistently argued 
that consensus was not needed to make meaningful 
changes and instead those resistant to change could be 
“worked around”. 
A key concern for many related to the difficulties they 
saw associated with enacting changes, particularly with 
regard to large scale infrastructure (such as electrification 
of transport). This led them to question how transitions 
could be enacted both in terms of getting the support of 
publics and developing the necessary material changes 
(e.g. charge stations replacing petrol stations). Such 
difficulties in transitioning were also highlighted for 
changes to ways of living, like demand shifting. Indeed, 
some of our participants described material realities that 
would not be sympathetic to the types of changes being 
discussed, even if they themselves were – e.g. for those 
living in flats putting washing machines on at off peak 
times would be disruptive because of noisy appliances 
(also see Theme 6). 
In this regard, changes that interrupted the existing 
rhythms of everyday life were viewed as problematic 
even for those who were enthusiastic about transition. 
Forms of transition that could be integrated with 
current rhythms and ways of doing were thus viewed 
as more plausible and possible for more people living in 
diverse circumstances. For example, there was greater 
enthusiasm for the idea of “battery-exchange stations”, 
rather than charging points, when thinking about 
recharging electric vehicles. Such endorsement is perhaps 
the result of our participants being able to envision how 
this way of charging could occur, marking the change as 
being different to current ways of refuelling vehicles, yet 
at the same time familiar. 
Thus far we have discussed the type of future our 
participants are enthusiastic about (i.e. a sustainable 
energy system based on particular values, for example 
the infinite nature of resources, underpinning system 
development) and discussed some of the challenges 
envisioned for energy system transformation. We now 
turn to the aspects of our findings that show how 
our participants felt change could be encouraged and 
supported. 
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Perhaps the most obvious, yet nonetheless important way 
our participants suggested change could be encouraged 
was by ensuring that what we are changing to is both 
available and works. For example, much of the remaining 
hesitation surrounding renewable energy technologies 
(which our participants supported) was about whether or 
not the form under consideration could provide enough 
power for present and future needs, if and when it was 
needed. Concerns about efficacy were, however, wider 
ranging than this and extended beyond forms of energy 
production into both demand-side aspects and energy 
infrastructures. For example, concerns about electric cars 
included their cost, performance and how they would be 
charged; i.e. whether charging infrastructures would be 
available (also see Theme 4).
Participants in the research volunteered, and were 
encouraged to think about, a number of different 
measures that could stimulate action on change. These 
included voluntary measures, regulation, coercion and 
force, restrictions, incentives, grants and promotion/
guidance measures. It was rare that any of the options 
were seen as being enough – in most cases participants 
preferred a combination.
P: There are always going to be a lot of people who don’t 
care about this… they want to get in their car, do what 
they want to do. They want a big powerful car because 
it makes them feel great… We talked about it earlier, it 
is about educating people, but some people don’t want to 
be educated or don’t care, so sometimes you have to force 
them… incentives and grants are a good idea, and giving 
us options… (Cardiff) 
 
Force and penalties were thus seen as a potentially 
necessary part of the solution but our participants also 
cautioned against its overuse. In terms of restricting 
options, recent measures to prevent the sale of 
incandescent bulbs was held up as a positive move, 
whereby a clear example over what is inappropriate 
had been set. Yet caution was also advised as there was 
considerable concern about draconian imposition and 
loss of freedoms. When it came to incentives, participants 
emphasised it was absolutely necessary that the benefits 
to the individual should be made clear. In this regard, an 
example of best practice was the “reward” of a lower car 
tax for buying a smaller sized, more efficient vehicle. 
A central element of public discourse about stimulating 
change related to education and calls for more or 
improved education about what is required. Our analysis 
would indicate that this is not necessarily just a call 
for more information or indicative of a need for greater 
understanding. 
Instead, it represented a response to the recognition that 
they were not encountering indications of the imperatives 
for energy system change within their daily lives. In this 
regard, participant calls for “education” were connected to 
an identified need for sustained, repeated, and sometimes 
subtle, promotion of how things should be changed and 
of the options to make a difference that are available to 
people.
P: It’s things like the number of people that watch things 
like Coronation Street and EastEnders. If you, if those 
makers inserted certain things in there like when they get 
up and turn the light switch off, or they do this, you’re not 
being told to do something you just recognise something. 
(Cumbria) 
 
This connects with a core concern that our participants 
noted with regard to their opportunities to find time to 
think about and reflect upon the topic of the workshops. 
Indeed, some of our participants suggested that a lack 
of spaces for reflection on energy matters may be a key 
stumbling block for both engaging publics and enacting 
change.
P: Today has given us the opportunity to think about it 
and discuss it really in depth and it’s something a lot of 
people won’t get the chance to do, but it has obviously 
taught us something even just by talking with each other 
and that is what a lot of people are perhaps lacking. 
(Cardiff) 
 
Finding ways to make space for reflection on current 
ways of doing and creating possibilities for engagement 
may thus be important in developing a firm basis for 
change and a new set of relations between state and civil 
society. Integration of new approaches within daily life 
as suggested in the quote above could form an important 
part of these processes of space making. 
Creating possibilities for 
engagement may be important 
in developing a firm basis for 
change and a new set of relations 
between state and civil society.
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Beyond the types of transition that were preferred, the 
challenges, and the possibilities for stimulating change, 
our participants expressed particular viewpoints on 
the best time to enact change, both for individuals and 
at a national scale. In this regard, opportune times for 
change were identified as arising when something 
needed to be repaired or replaced, so as to minimise 
disruption to everyday life. In many senses, this suggests 
that intermediate actors in energy system change, such 
as sales people (e.g. car dealers and retail managers) 
and trades people, may be particularly important 
in encouraging the uptake of certain pieces of kit or 
approaches. At present this aspect of transition is 
potentially lacking in terms of the attention that may be 
needed. Our participants gave examples of times they 
had wanted to implement changes (such as new forms 
of heating system) and were met with hurdles in terms 
of securing the necessary expertise or being able to find 
advice and information. This results in the perpetuation of 
certain technological pathways as illustrated in the quote 
below with reference to gas central heating systems.
P: We looked at all sorts of things, we looked at ground 
pumps and all the eco stuff and Weismann boilers, and all 
these wonderful systems and we asked about 9 heating 
engineers around and nobody would put anything else in 
other than this type of boiler and system. Basically, you 
couldn’t find anyone to do anything at all so that was 
what we ended up with by default. What we’d looked at 
in the beginning and gone all round the houses and all 
these wondrous systems, which would have been more 
eco-friendly maybe, and we ended up with the bog-
standard combi-boiler. (Cumbria) 
 
Such occurrences highlight the importance of 
intervention initiatives being targeted at a range of scales 
and stakeholders. They also underscore the importance 
of ensuring that there are training opportunities for 
those who will be responsible for physically installing 
new forms of technology. A notably trusted source for the 
transmission of different ways of doing (including the 
installation of kit as well as changes in practices) was that 
of friends and families who have already installed the 
intervention under consideration. Again this points to the 
need to be far more dynamic in the scales at which, and 
ways in which, interventions are targeted. 
Of key concern to our participants was that any change 
suggested should be worthwhile, for example in terms 
of its impact on the issues (monetary and energy), and 
viable, for example in terms of ability to find information 
or finance changes. The absence of either of these things 
could undermine support for any intervention. In the 
following illustrations two different examples of this type 
of concern within public discourse are given. 
P: It doesn’t seem worthwhile all that land, I’m sure we 
could put that land to better use to be honest, to grow 
crops that make money and build more turbines as well, it 
doesn’t seem like we are getting enough back from using 
all that land. And again what that’s gonna do in these 
areas that you’re using that land, that would outweigh 
what we’re actually getting back from using all that land. 
(Edinburgh)
P1: Probably not only because we’ve gone through that 
change once. You’ve gone through your wooden windows 
to your PVC windows, which are double glazed. You’ve 
made that one big move and they are guaranteed for 20 
years, really you’re not going to change them within that 
20 years as it’s only a slight advantage [to triple glaze].
P2: Yeah, you can see the big advantage when you go 
from your draughty sash windows to double and you 
can’t imagine that bigger jump again. I mean I can’t hear 
noise anymore it’s not going to get any better. (Cardiff)
Throughout this theme we have shown how our 
participants discussed a range of groups, stakeholders, 
and individuals, as playing important roles in the 
enactment and delivery of change. This is indicative of the 
perception that responsibility for change does not reside 
with one single group. Given that public(s) have been 
found in prior research to often position responsibility for 
environmental issues with government (e.g. see Poortinga 
et al. 2006; Butler and Pidgeon, 2011; Eurobarometer, 2011), 
it is interesting to reflect on the ways that the roles and 
responsibilities of government were viewed, particularly 
regarding their role for engendering and enacting change. 
For our participants, government was perceived to have 
an important role in developing an overall vision to 
work towards. This included creating the policies and 
structures needed to encourage change (e.g. improving 
public transport) and being clear with regard to the 
available options. In addition, participants expressed 
concerns that government continued to convey mixed 
signals and that existing measures being taken to 
address energy issues appeared limited. This latter point 
was not just about policy trajectories but also arose as 
related to the individual behaviours of MPs and other 
government officials. Indeed, there were repeated calls for 
government to lead by example and move beyond what 
was sometimes perceived as pure rhetoric. Clearing up 
seeming inconsistencies in policies and legislation was 
identified as a further responsibility of government.
P: People seem to get penalised for doing that as well, 
some people have changed their cars or converted their 
cars to run on old cooking oil which they get taxed on… 
so they are trying to make changes but it is not easy and 
as the Government can’t control that, they can essentially 
run the car for free but people will get penalised, so its 
mixed messages. (Cardiff)
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This section has navigated through the ways that our 
publics imagine change, including the changes that are 
preferable or desirable (e.g. sustainable energy systems 
– see earlier discussion), how it can be engendered (e.g. 
mixture of instruments including voluntary, force, option 
provision), when it can/should be enacted and by whom. 
Through this discussion we have also touched upon some 
of the difficulties (e.g. efficacy of interventions, knowing 
our options and finding skilled trades people), constraints 
(e.g. mixed signals and positive qualities of current 
systems), and perceived limits (e.g. the need to move 
beyond a regime of accumulation). Ultimately, the key 
message is that whilst there were some reservations over 
the particular form transitions might take, our participants 
were enthusiastic about, rather than resistant to, the 
opportunity for making a significant change.
Members of the public are positive about and 
enthusiastic for change, both in terms of the ways 
that we produce and use energy, and in terms 
of wider cultural ideas that are related to energy 
systems (e.g. cultures of high consumption). This 
is paralleled by deep concern about the prospect of 
‘doing nothing’. 
There is recognition of the potential need for 
regulation and regulatory measures in order to 
deliver transitions, particularly as a means to 
‘kick start’ change and send clear signals about its 
importance. Incentives are, however, preferable as 
measures to generate new ways of doing.
T3: Affordability, Responsibility and Trust  
for Energy System Transitions
As a key aspect of policy discourse about energy system 
transitions, affordability represents a deeply contested 
and multifaceted issue. Questions about cost and 
affordability span multiple interrelated aspects of concern 
in energy system change that operate across different 
scales. They encompass issues regarding infrastructure 
development; investment and subsidy; consumer 
purchases and investments; financial (dis)incentives 
and running costs associated with things like personal 
transport; energy bills and affordability of energy in 
the home – this in turn relates to issues of fuel poverty, 
energy saving and demand reduction. In this theme we 
unpack public discourse relating to cost and affordability 
in energy system transitions. The theme explores the 
different ways that issues about cost were characterised 
by participants and gives insight into key public concerns 
regarding affordability and the financing of transitions. 
The discussion pertains to views about cost with regard 
to both current energy systems and the development of 
future ones. 
In the research, costs were treated carefully due to the 
high levels of uncertainty and contestation which arise 
out of the multiple factors that influence calculations; 
such as ruling market conditions or the commodity prices 
for fuels and carbon (see Mott Macdonald, 2010), and 
disagreements over aspects of calculation like discount 
rates (e.g. Harrison, 2010). Additionally, there is complexity 
in calculating the impact of energy system transition costs 
on customer bills adding a further layer of uncertainty 
(see DECC, 2011b). As such, discussions of cost were 
approached through a series of “what if” prompts and 
probes. For example, “what if that was substantially more 
expensive – would that affect your view?” was posed in 
cases where people were particularly positive about an 
aspect of change, or the converse if they were particularly 
negative. Additionally, when participants asked about 
costs, we probed on why they were concerned about cost, 
and what underpinned that concern. We also posed some 
key hypotheticals, such as scenarios for higher but stable 
bills contrasted with potentially lower but fluctuating bills.
Through the analysis we found that questions relating to 
“who pays” for system transitions were bound up with 
discussions of energy bills and costs more generally, as 
well as with concerns regarding trust and responsibility. 
As such, though trust and responsibility forms a lens 
that has relevance across many of the themes in this 
report and is discussed elsewhere, we give this aspect of 
discourse more detailed treatment in this section. 
Participants expressed concerns 
that government continued 
to convey mixed signals and 
that existing measures being 
taken to address energy 
issues appeared limited.
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The first dimension of public discourse we wish to 
discuss relates to public views on energy affordability 
and concern about rising bills. In this regard, energy 
affordability and increases in costs for energy (across 
home, transport and business) evoked very high levels of 
concern, particularly in the context of current economic 
difficulties and austerity. 
P: I generally worry about the price because the way 
things are going, is like you know you wake up the 
following day and the energy company will just tell me 
that there will be an increase in price, and there is nothing 
you can do about it so most of the time I tend to worry 
about the price.
M: Is that a concern for other people?
P: Definitely, price is a major concern… (London) 
 
This quote also signals a sense of powerlessness regarding 
energy pricing and costs, which can be seen as indicative 
of public views that the market does not operate in a way 
that allows them to exert consumer power (e.g. through 
purchasing from a different supplier at a lower rate). 
Connected to these findings are results regarding public 
perceptions of the reasons for price rises. In the main, 
public perceptions about this were not linked, as might 
be anticipated given media coverage in recent years (BBC 
News online, 2012; The Guardian, 2011; The Telegraph, 
2011), to concern about investment in renewable energy 
or government policies. Instead, they focused on energy 
companies as profit making entities.
P: They (energy companies) are making so many huge 
profits off the energy we are buying from them... They 
won’t reduce the cost of our energy though they are 
paying less, like British Gas, even when the cost per unit 
for them goes down they don’t drop our prices. (Merthyr) 
 
Though concern about bills did undoubtedly form an 
important aspect of public concern, this did not translate 
straightforwardly in to rejection of more costly routes to 
change. Interestingly, there is some evidence to indicate 
that if the reasons for bill rises were to pay for particularly 
desirable aspects of transition (e.g. renewable energy 
– see also Spence et al. 2010b) they are regarded more 
favourably.
P: I think it definitely does just make more sense to use 
the renewable form…
M: Okay, even if it meant prices going up now?
P: Well if it went up now, like to cover the costs and things 
like that, I mean the price of like gas and stuff like that 
now, is rising anyway, so either way we are going to see 
prices going up… so if it is going to go up, we may as well 
bite the bullet with the renewable forms as opposed to the 
gas and that. (Glasgow) 
 
These two positions (i.e. concern about bills coupled with 
preferences not contingent on costs) may appear, at a 
superficial level, to be contradictory or even unreasonable. 
Examined in the context of discourse about how to 
pay to for transitions, however, and with attention to 
what underpins such views, they become far more 
understandable. The more positive positions on consumer 
bills in some way providing a basis for financing different 
elements of transition were tempered by a fundamental 
distrust in energy companies regarding the opaque nature 
of energy bills and markets, and scepticism about their 
efforts to deliver fair pricing (see also Ipsos MORI, 2012). 
P: It’s gone up by about 19%, we just got that in the last 
week or something like that, [murmurs of agreement 
from group] and they are all doing the same thing. Now 
they’re not asking us, they’re just imposing it on us, and 
that’s an unfortunate thing that when you do get things 
imposed like that and you don’t know why, you don’t 
know the reasons, I mean they just come up and say this 
is what we are going to make it, and that’s the increase. 
(Edinburgh)
P: …they blast you with jargon, blast you with all sorts  
of figures and kilowatts and whatever, and you don’t 
know what you are paying for. (Cumbria) 
 
In this context, then, though we found some support 
for bill increases to pay for the forms of transition that 
were desirable (e.g. renewable supply technologies), we 
anticipate that this is unlikely to be meaningful in real 
world contexts because many other things enter into 
the formulation of views on this issue. For example, our 
participants raised more fundamental questions about 
whether transitions should be financed through consumer 
bills at all. To unpack this further, it is necessary to discuss 
the complex narrative of responsibility that was evident 
across the dataset. 
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Though members of the public took on a level of 
responsibility themselves in enabling, fostering and, 
crucially, paying for transitions, this was disrupted by a 
sense that these transitions were fundamentally a social 
good that should be financed in a way that distributes 
costs fairly. In this regard those that had benefitted most 
from the existing system of fossil fuel production and 
sale were seen as having higher level responsibilities for 
contributing toward the financing of transitions.
P: It just occurred to me that at the end of the day these 
are the people that are making the money and are the 
source of producing the carbon… electricity companies 
obviously. So they have to have some ownership of it as 
they have had so many years of profit making and offering 
us gas and electric, definitely they have to take some 
responsibility for it themselves. (Cardiff)  
 
This was confounded by a sense that energy companies 
were not, at present, contributing to what was ultimately 
viewed as an undertaking that must be reciprocal in 
process and outcomes. 
P: We would give a little bit more if we saw where their 
profits were making an impact as that would make us 
want to help a little bit more. (Cardiff) 
 
There was, then, a strong emphasis on the significance of 
companies making different investment decisions and, 
rather than raising bills, reinvesting profits. This position 
should not be regarded as naïve, however, as this was 
how people thought things should be and it was strongly 
tempered by a sense that this was not how things are 
or how they are likely to be in the future. It offers some 
explanatory power though, in understanding why there 
were strong preferences for potentially more costly routes 
to change despite deep concern about rising costs. 
In addition to these concerns about responsibilities for 
financing transitions, publics discussed responsibility for 
ensuring energy is kept affordable. In official discourses 
affordability tends to be positioned, in the main, as an 
outcome of a properly operating market and is related to 
questions of market price. At present, high dependency on 
fossil fuels (particularly gas) means that their wholesale 
price forms the focus as the most significant factor with 
regard to varying energy bills (see DECC, 2011b). This way 
of thinking about affordability and variation in pricing, 
however, represents a narrow characterisation of the 
issues when contrasted with public views, which signal a 
much wider range of concerns as important (e.g. trust in 
energy operators). In this regard, official discourses do not 
indicate clear responsibility for the delivery of affordable 
energy but relegate this to something that ‘the market’ 
delivers. In public discourse, by contrast, responsibility for 
ensuring affordability represented a key aspect of concern. 
Here, similarly to the findings discussed in Theme 2 we 
found that responsibility was distributed and not located 
with any one group. At one level, participants expressed a 
personal sense of responsibility for reducing or controlling 
energy use in order to keep costs low.
P: I am concerned about it [energy costs], but it’s just 
knowing what else can we do and what else can 
everybody else do - it’s almost like taking personal 
responsibility. (Cumbria) 
At another level, they positioned government as 
ultimately responsible for ensuring energy remained 
affordable. This was despite energy companies and their 
‘untrustworthy’ practices being the focus of perceptions 
relating to the reasons behind bill increases or ‘unfair’ 
prices. This finding can be made more understandable 
if we analyse the different characterisations of the 
relationships between state and citizen and between 
company and consumer. Here the concept of social 
contracts offers a useful lens for interpretation. 
The notion of social contracts refers to an agreement of 
reciprocal responsibilities, rights and obligations between 
state and citizens (e.g. citizens pay taxes, vote and obey 
laws in return for the state maintaining order, fostering 
citizen wellbeing, and providing education, health services 
and so forth – O’Brien et al., 2009). In our participant’s 
formulation of responsibility for ensuring energy 
affordability, it is possible to see how a sense of reciprocal 
obligations underpinned their views on the roles of state 
and citizen. That is, public(s) took on a degree of personal 
responsibility for keeping costs down (not using energy 
wastefully and so forth) and government was expected 
to ensure energy continued to be available at affordable 
prices. By contrast, energy companies were regarded as 
principally profit oriented and as having no social reason 
to keep prices low or ensure affordability as a dimension 
of well being. Additionally, participant’s perceived the 
competitive function of energy markets as inadequate 
and, as such, the market was not perceived to be an 
effective mechanism for ensuring fair prices. 
P1: …part of the problem is that they have opened up the 
market place and the market place now dictates what we 
pay whereas before it was centralised and government-led 
and a fair price for all, now we swap and the next week 
they put their prices up and you wish you stayed with 
that one.
P2: I think it does need to be uniform because at the 
minute we are playing in a monopoly and we are losing 
because they are getting mega big bucks from the profits. 
(Cumbria) 
 
Deliberating Energy System Transitions in the UK   25 
Transforming the UK Energy System: Public Values, Attitudes and Acceptability 
Though participants felt energy companies should be 
taking responsibility for ensuring affordability, the nature 
of the relationship between company and consumer was 
not viewed as one with a basis for reciprocal responsibility. 
Instead, it was characterised as one based only on the 
person paying their bill and the company ensuring 
available energy supply – an exchange between customer 
and company with no wider sense of moral obligation. 
The relationship of rights and reciprocal responsibilities 
is thus conceived as one between state and citizen. While 
the relationship between business and consumer is one of 
contractual agreement and financial payment. 
This latter relationship is one which has become 
intertwined with social contracts with regard to the 
energy system but is qualitatively different in its 
formulation. Perhaps problematically ‘corporations, unlike 
governments, are not accountable to citizens, who have no 
authority to install or dismiss them if they feel aggrieved 
or violated’ (O’Brien et al., p. 3). Responsibility for ensuring 
affordability was therefore located with government 
precisely because people felt they had recourse to call on 
government to meet this obligation in a way that they did 
not with companies. This conception of how responsibility 
operates within energy systems was not, then, viewed as 
positive – nor was it normative in the sense of being how 
people thought things ought to be – but it emerged as a 
pragmatic interpretation of how the system operated. This 
raises an important set of questions in thinking about 
change to social contracts, as corporations have become 
increasingly involved in important ways but without 
development of the corresponding societal responsibilities 
to underpin such involvement. 
This difference in the ways that corporations and 
government were ultimately viewed is also connected 
to public views on their trustworthiness. In this regard, 
our participant’s discourse did confer some level of 
what might be regarded as trust in energy companies. 
Given that relationships with energy companies are 
contractually based and involve exchange of payment 
for energy to support services, companies have a self 
interest in providing this service as they are profit making 
entities. In this sense, companies are trusted to deliver 
energy services in exchange for payment. That is to say, 
they are trusted to undertake things that appear to align 
with company interests, as their actions are therefore 
understandable, even if not liked. 
The other side of this, however, is that mistrust and 
suspicion arise with regard to actions that appear to be 
against company interests (see also Terwel et al. 2011). In 
this regard, though there were widespread calls for energy 
companies to take a role in paying for transitions, they 
were not trusted (or anticipated) to do so under current 
business models and approaches. 
P: The energy companies are profit making concerns. I 
don’t know what incentive there is for them to encourage 
people to save energy that reduces their profits… so 
obviously they are going to be politically campaigning 
against it... (London) 
Equally, whilst government was expected to take a strong 
role in the delivery of fairly and adequately financed 
transitions, it was not necessarily trusted to do so. Of 
particular concern were the wider actions of government 
in terms of public spending. This was fundamentally 
related to what Wynne (1996) has referred to as the ‘body 
language’ of institutions (also Otway and Wynne, 1989). 
Participants in the research noted various elements 
of such institutional body language, which called into 
question the trustworthiness of government and/or the 
credibility of information about the urgency and severity 
of energy issues. Seeming contradictions between formal 
communications and political action represented one 
element of such ‘body language’ but so too did spending 
decisions seen to be at odds with imperatives of energy 
system change. 
P: Perhaps stop wasting hundreds of millions of pounds 
on failed world cup bids. That would have insulated a hell 
of a lot of houses. Realistically things like that could go  
a long way. (Cardiff) 
 
Ultimately neither government nor energy companies 
were trusted to ensure fair financing of energy system 
transitions. In this regard participants anticipated 
that changes would be required, both in the ways 
that companies are formulated and in the ways that 
government behaves, to create a context for reciprocal 
responsibility in the delivery of affordable energy through 
transitions. Crucially, efforts to bring the requirements of 
energy system transitions in line with energy company 
interests were seen as potentially essential for changes  
to be successfully enacted. 
P: That difference between profits and what is best for 
the country is something that I think is a problem with 
business and it is going to be extremely hard. You might 
force people, you might make these companies, which 
already have so many things they have to do, but are they 
going to invest as much? …It has to be for their  
own good… (London) 
 
In this section we have examined the ways that questions 
of cost and affordability with regard to energy systems 
and prospective transitions are negotiated by members 
of the public. We have aimed to highlight how cost is 
formulated as a multi-dimensional concern with a wide 
range of things being brought into consideration in the 
construction of public preferences. These include public(s) 
feelings about energy companies and the liberalised 
market system, their feelings about government, their 
concerns about equity, and their views with regard 
to trust and responsibility. We have explored public 
characterisations of the major issues connected to 
energy costs and paying for transitions, including how 
responsibility for financing transitions is and should 
be configured, how this relates to responsibilities for 
ensuring energy remains affordable, and how far public(s) 
trust energy companies and government to deliver on 
their responsibilities. 
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Centrally, we highlight that cost is unlikely to be 
straightforwardly “traded off” against other aspects of 
energy system transition, such as moves to renewable 
energy supply technologies, because of the numerous 
elements encompassed within concern about the issue. For 
example, publics may not believe that bills are going up in 
order to fund energy system development of the kinds they 
want because current energy costs and bills are perceived to 
be opaque and unfair. Equally, they raise more fundamental 
questions about why they should pay through their bills 
for something that is considered to be a social good – 
something that does not correspond with the consumer-
supplier relationship as it is currently configured. 
All this points to an important set of questions about 
the relationships between public(s), government and 
energy companies and the distribution of costs and 
benefits in paying for 2050 transitions. It suggests that 
changes may be required with regard to the ways that 
these relationships are currently configured; particularly 
the embedded forms of reciprocal responsibility upon 
which rule by consent rests. It does also suggest that any 
renegotiation of social contracts may need to be time 
sensitive, explicitly considering debts to the past as well as 
obligations to future citizens (see O’Brien et al. 2009). 
This is a complex area of public attitude research and 
further study of public engagement with cost represents 
a key issue for future research. Central to this research 
would be the necessity to address the multiple dimensions 
of concern about costs (e.g. existing market structures, 
perception of energy as a basic need, trust, motives and 
responsibility). This is particularly important as there 
is a danger of simplistic interpretation with regard to 
public responses to questions about cost. For example, 
publics will frequently reference the importance of cost 
‘off the cuff’, but, as we indicate here, this aspect of public 
discourse is far more complicated and nuanced than can 
be revealed through straightforward questioning about 
higher or lower bills.
Concern about bills and increasing energy costs 
is high. This concern is not related to ‘green’ 
government policies but to perceptions of energy 
companies as profit-making entities and as 
untrustworthy in their management of energy 
costing. 
There is some evidence to suggest that higher bills 
would be accepted if it was to pay for desirable 
forms of transitions (e.g. renewable energy). 
However, distrust toward both government and 
energy companies is likely to mean that members 
of the public will not believe monies levied through 
bills are being spent to this end. This means such 
findings are unlikely to manifest as acceptability in 
‘real world’ contexts.
T4: Uncertainty, Risk Making and Risk Taking 
Numerous commentators have noted an increased 
concern with risk and the management of uncertainty 
in the governance of socio-technical issues over the past 
few decades (e.g. see Beck 1992; Slovic 1998; Lupton 1999; 
Power 2004; Pidgeon et al. 2008). In this context, there has 
been increasing interest in the ways that members of the 
public characterise risks and uncertainties associated 
with particular energy system technologies (e.g. see 
Wynne, 1992 and Parkhill et al. 2010 on nuclear energy). 
Thus far, however, there has not been research examining 
public characterisations of risk and uncertainty related to 
whole energy systems and processes of transition. In this 
theme, we navigate through our participant’s discourse 
exploring the ways that “risk” emerges and analysing the 
implications of views on riskiness for public perspectives 
on system transformation. 
Over the last several decades, socio-cultural risk 
researchers have shown that meanings of risk go 
beyond realist framings of risk as objective hazards or 
probabilistic technical definitions. Instead, interpretive 
risk researchers have shown that ‘meanings of risk are 
discursively negotiated, dynamic and part of a wider 
set of social relations’ (Parkhill et al., 2011, p. 324; also 
see Wynne, 1991; 1992; Eyles et al., 1993; Simmons and 
Walker, 1999). In an effort to neither under nor over-
state the importance of risk, there has also been a shift 
toward research that examines risk within the context 
of everyday life (Tulloch and Lupton, 2003; Henwood et 
al. 2008). The challenge with the present study is that 
the everyday lives we are interested in do not currently 
exist and so we are exploring participants’ imaginings – 
technical, social, geographical – of potential future risks 
(see ‘Introduction’, ‘Methods’ and Theme 7). 
This section is organised around an analytic distinction 
between risk making and risk taking. Risk Making involves 
exploration of talk that is related to the implementation 
of some form of intervention by others (e.g. the building of 
a new nuclear power station), which our participants felt 
could leave them vulnerable to risk. Risk Taking entails 
analysis of discourse regarding either a change they 
themselves have chosen to enact, which nevertheless 
brings feeling of vulnerability to risk, or a change they 
may wish to avoid as they feel it would put them “at risk” 
(e.g. installing solar panels). 
In terms of Risk Making, it was deemed extremely 
important that technological developments across the 
whole system – established and emergent – are safe. In 
particular, that human health should not be affected now 
and in the future was of deep concern. In the following 
excerpt, the focus is on Carbon Capture and Storage 
(CCS) but this was equally true of other energy system 
technologies.
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P: What happens if it [carbon dioxide] escapes? …I 
don’t know much about these things, could it cause an 
explosion or something like that or what would happen  
if it leaked in to the atmosphere or whatever, what  
would happen? (Merthyr) 
 
Issues such as these might be met with responses that 
point to assessments of the likelihood of an incident as 
highly improbable. This form of response, however, neglects 
that which is at the core of such questions and statements 
– i.e. deep seated concerns about the uncertainties and 
unknowns regarding the potential consequence(s) in the 
event that an incident does occur. Concerns, in this regard, 
were not limited to health issues they also encompassed 
potential impacts on the environment (for example, wind 
turbines causing ecological damage). 
Our participants articulated fairly sophisticated 
understandings of the likelihood and scale of risks. In this 
regard, low probability events with high consequences 
(e.g. a nuclear accident) were of concern because of the 
scale of the impacts rather the frequency or likelihood of 
occurrence. Whilst for a rare few this was an acceptable 
risk, for many the scale of the potential impacts was 
enough to bring them to omit technologies, like nuclear, 
from their imagined futures. 
P1: But I am a bit of a gambler, and I would be willing to 
gamble that that nuclear power plant blowing up against 
having this lovely lifestyle, but that’s…
P2: So did the Japanese probably and Chernobyl and that 
they probably done that gamble.
P1: Exactly, but the chance of that happening are probably 
10,000 to 1 and I would be happy with the odds.
P3: Would you be happy with you or your family living 
next door to it, ‘cause somebody’s got to live next door  
to it?
P1: Absolutely, if there was no detriment to my health and 
safety absolutely no problem with that. But that’s what 
I’m saying, I would take that gamble. I could walk out 
there today and get run over by a double Decker and there 
is probably more chance of that happening than a nuclear 
power plant blowing up. I would take that gamble.
P2: Cross at the traffic lights and you’ll be fine [giggles].
(Cumbria). 
 
In the above quote, participant 1 points to other activities 
which he regards as riskier thereby normalising the risks 
of nuclear power (see also Parkhill et al., 2010). Yet the 
other participants work hard to shut down this discourse 
by pointing out the incongruity in the terms of the 
consequences should an event occur. Ultimately, however, 
it is the humorous parting jab from participant 2 that 
punctuates the difference between the two risk events 
at the centre of the discussion – whilst participant 1 can 
perhaps take some mediating action to avoid being run 
over by a bus, he does not have the means of control to 
avoid a catastrophic nuclear incident.
Some components of energy system transition were less 
likely to be incorporated in future energy system visions 
due to concerns about the risks of being stigmatised. 
Stigma has been defined as ‘an attribute or token 
of infamy, disgrace, or reproach [which] reduces the 
possessor ... from whole and usual, to marked, violated, 
and damaged’ (Wakefield and McMullan, 2005, p.301). 
Though stigma was originally conceptualised as relating 
to a person’s individual attributes, it has been extended 
to incorporate consideration of the ways that ‘negative 
affective responses’ can transfer from technologies or 
objects (e.g. places, industries) to people (Walker, 2001, 
p. 354; also see Fischhoff, 2001). In this regard living in 
an area where a particular energy system infrastructure 
is located can confer a form of what has been termed 
‘geographic stigma’. This type of stigmatisation formed 
the principle focus of concerns: 
P: Just one of these things, you look at one or hear about 
it and you are just like no, I don’t want one of those near 
me, with radiation and stuff. The thing as well, if they put 
it in Edinburgh people would be like “I’m not going there”.
(Edinburgh) 
 
In part, such concerns about stigma are related to 
participants’ mediated experiences of previous incidents 
(for example, Fukushima), but in other ways they are 
connected with wider concerns about the technologies 
(for example, nuclear has been found to be uniquely 
dreaded – see Slovic, 1987). Whilst feelings of dread and 
uneasiness are in many senses unique to nuclear power, 
we also found some striking similarities between the 
perceived risks of nuclear power and carbon capture 
and storage. Both shared a similar logic: they involve 
the generation of power and the production of a waste 
product that needs transporting away and storing 
indefinitely. 
Socio-political risks represented a further key concern 
in relation to certain forms of energy generation. In 
particular, the potential for resource conflicts around 
fossil fuels represented one of the underlying reasons for 
many excluding these energy sources from their future 
visions. Other issues related to the potential for land 
conflicts around energy system elements, such as biomass 
and onshore wind energy. While some voiced concerns 
connected to the legacy risks that might be left for future 
generations (see also Theme 5). 
P: The only plus of capturing it is that you maybe hope 
that they discover some technology further down the 
line, but that’s sort of putting the problem onto other 
generations anyway. (Merthyr) 
 
A final element in terms of risk making that we wish to 
focus on related to choice and the extent to which choice 
was available to people. Broadly speaking, our participants 
felt it would not be up to them to decide whether or 
not we should pursue some of the larger supply-side 
options and that they would have little say or sway in 
the decisions. In the following excerpt the participant is 
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responding to a question about their views on different 
forms of energy supply. Their quote encapsulates a 
dichotomy that was drawn between perceived lack of 
choice over large interventions and the ability to choose  
or take up options on a smaller scale. 
P: See that choice though, is that not kinda out of our 
hands mainly, ‘cause on the other things it was personal 
to our homes, whereas that one it depends on what the 
government choose, if they choose to keep a nuclear power 
plant or if they choose to open one of these biomass. 
(Edinburgh) 
 
The presence or absence of choice in terms of risk has 
been found in previous research to be significant in the 
formation of people’s sense of risk (e.g. see Slovic, 1987; 
Wynne, 1996). In short, when the risk involved arises as 
a consequence of personal choice (e.g. sky diving), the 
risk is not negatively perceived in the same way as it is 
when a risk is imposed. The notion that large scale supply 
technologies are not an aspect public(s) have choice over, 
as the quote above highlights, may thus result in a greater 
tendency for risk to be viewed more negatively with regard 
to these aspects of system change. 
This leads us on to think about our second analytic 
thread risk taking. The above reasoning may lead us to 
conclude that elements of transition involving voluntary 
action by publics will be less likely to engender anxieties 
and concerns about risks. However, we found that many 
of our participants articulated an underlying sense of 
vulnerability when discussing changes to their personal 
practices. In this regard, such actions were characterised 
as involving risk taking. 
P: I used to bike to college and out of college every day…I 
was quite happy to use a bike. But traffic has increased 
enormously and that’s what worries me especially around 
country lanes. (Cumbria) 
 
In the illustration above, the participant, who is an older 
gentleman, is talking about when he was a younger man 
and felt comfortable cycling but explains that now, due 
to increases in traffic, a rather mundane activity has 
been transformed into a risky endeavour. Although this 
example pertains to rural life, across the dataset a lack 
of appropriate infrastructure arose as a key reason as to 
why greater use of lower carbon forms of transport were 
thought unlikely to occur – be it using public transport  
or cycling more.
Although micro-generation technologies (particularly 
solar) were desirable for many participants, talk 
about investing in new ways of producing energy and 
transitioning from consumer to prosumer (i.e. someone 
who uses the energy they themselves produce) was also 
imbued with a sense of risk (on prosumers see Potter, 
Archambault, Westrick, 2009). 
P: To be honest with you, I think part of it is as well that if 
anyone sticks their head above the parapet to try and do 
anything, you know like, if there was a river like running 
in the back of your garden, people are so frightened to do 
it because they think if they try and do that the council is 
going to block me. I’m frightened that I am going to get…
into trouble by doing something that’s slightly different. 
(Cumbria).
P: I’m concerned about my roof. My neighbour had solar 
heating on his roof, and he complained about the roof 
leaking. The main damage to slate roofs is caused by 
people who put up television aerials and people who do 
things on your roof who aren’t roofers, so I am hesitant 
about putting solar cells up. (Cumbria).  
 
Both of the quotes above are indicative of the 
uncertainties and potential risks that are perceived 
in moves to the production of energy within homes 
and locales. For the first participant, this related to 
the difficulties of navigating complex and unknown 
governance structures, rules and regulations. The second 
quote is indicative of concerns about the risks of poor 
installation and maintenance issues that come with 
making changes to your home. 
Across the dataset a lack of 
appropriate infrastructure arose 
as a key reason as to why greater 
use of lower carbon forms of 
transport were thought unlikely 
to occur – be it using public 
transport or cycling more.
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Being an early adopter of new technological forms and 
ways of doing was also seen as being potentially risky. 
In part this was due to a perceived lack of existing 
infrastructure to support and facilitate its use in everyday 
life – for example, the electric car and lack of EV charging 
points leading to the now well-known ‘range anxiety’ issue 
(e.g. see Franke, Neumann, Bühler, Cocron and Krems, 
2012). However, it was also clear that participants felt 
that technologies take time to develop and iron-out any 
issues or flaws. In this regard, being an early adopter was 
viewed as leaving one vulnerable to technical problems and 
disruption associated with technological failures.
P: The other thing I have noticed with a friend of mine 
– they have one of the new hybrid electric cars and 
they used to have a petrol car before, and they saw 
the immediate changes, but they’ve only had the car 
18 months and the electric car is actually having more 
problems than the old car they got rid of. (Cumbria) 
 
For some, then, it was important to be cautious in the 
potentially premature introduction of a “not quite 
[there]…pseudo technology” (Cumbria), or in changing 
ways of doing until it is possible to be more confident of 
the efficacy. Others, however, saw early adopters as taking 
on an important and necessary role related to the further 
enhancement of measures. The current economic climate 
also served as an important backdrop for adopting new 
practices and roles, particularly in relation to uptake of 
new technologies. Economic investments were seen as 
more precarious with the recession putting increased 
pressure on the need to make less risky investment 
choices – both in terms of capital and maintenance costs. 
An additional dimension to risk taking is related to a 
concept we introduced earlier in the discussion of risk 
making, that of stigma. Some participants spoke of a 
reluctance to take up new pieces of kit or different ways  
of doing due to a risk of being seen as different.
P: One of [the] important things is you don’t want to make 
it look like you are a special case necessarily…Personally 
I want to be normal, I don’t feel I need to make that 
statement. (Cardiff) 
 
This runs counter to the idea that the adoption of new 
technologies adds positively to a ‘sense of self’ and can be 
seen as fashionable (Katz and Sugiyama, 2005). Perhaps 
what excerpts like this reveal is a legacy of fear associated 
with stereotyping of environmentally conscious forms of 
action as being undertaken by ‘the hippie tree-hugger, the 
radical tree-spiker, the self-absorbed, … [or the] haughty 
green consumer’ (Delaure, 2011: p. 452). Such concerns 
about the risks of early adoption brought a recognition 
that the success of innovations often rest on a delicate 
balance between adoption and development. 
P: I wouldn’t buy electric cars unless I was sure that 
I would never run out. It’s what comes first - if the 
infrastructure isn’t there first, people won’t buy electric 
cars, but they won’t make electric cars unless they are 
convinced people are going to buy them. So it’s like a cycle, 
what comes first? (Cumbria) 
 
The sentiment of this quote can be summed up as “who 
is willing to take the risk first?” – this clearly represents a 
significant challenge in enacting low carbon transitions. 
It would be easy and erroneous to come away with the 
image that our participants were paralyzed by risk and 
thus reluctant to embrace change. As Theme 2 has 
already depicted, this is simply not the case. Whilst some 
risks were to be avoided, change more generally was 
not. Indeed, some of our participants suggested that the 
biggest risks do not arise from taking action, but rather 
from inaction.
P: People don’t realise though what is going to actually 
happen if they don’t [change] though. They think oh 
yeah it’s gonna carry on going and carry on going and 
everything’s going to be alright, they don’t [/won’t] realise 
until it actually happens. (Edinburgh) 
 
In this theme we have maneuvered through two key 
aspects of risk talk around energy system transitions: risk 
making and risk taking. In the discussion of risk making 
there were key developments that made the participants 
feel vulnerable to risk and thus generated a desire to avoid 
them. By way of contrast, in the analysis of risk taking, 
whilst risks were clearly acknowledged and significant, 
there does seem to be a greater openness to living with 
the risks involved. This is perhaps indicative of the 
previously discussed difference between imposed risks 
and risks that are taken by choice evoking greater and 
lesser degrees of concern respectively.
Due to concerns about the scale of potential 
impacts in the event of something going wrong, 
many participants desired to omit technologies like 
nuclear power from their imagined futures. 
For some of our participants the biggest risks do not 
arise from taking action, but rather from inaction.
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T5. Socio-Technical Change, ‘Non-Transitions’ 
and Pessimism 
Through other themes discussed thus far in this report 
we have offered insights into some of the parts of system 
change that are most (un)desirable in public energy 
system futures. In this theme we unpack further the 
underlying values and concerns that relate to aspects 
of change found to evoke discourses of contestation. In 
particular, we focus on carbon capture and storage (CCS) 
and biofuels as two energy system components that play 
significant roles in many existing expert or policy energy 
system scenarios and envisioned futures (e.g. see DECC, 
2011; Committee on Climate Change, CCC, 2011). 
Interestingly, discourses about both CCS and biofuels 
were characterised by similar underlying logics that 
formed the basis for views on these system components. 
This arises largely because in public discourse both were 
associated in different ways with fossil fuels and the 
negative perceptions attached to these energy resources. 
This section thus addresses the options of biofuels and 
CCS together, exploring public characterisations of these 
concerns and offering insights into the possibilities that 
exist for contestation as these approaches are developed. 
In the introduction to this report we foreground the notion 
that views and opinions are formed through processes of 
connecting up new information with existing values, world 
views and positions – this is particularly true of issues 
that are unfamiliar or relatively unknown to people (e.g. 
Wynne, 1996). For this reason, examining what underpins 
people’s views is important as it gives insight into the 
more general positions that underlie particular concerns. 
Put another way, if one is to understand emergent public 
attitudes, it is necessary to pay attention to the ‘underlying 
frameworks and dynamics that are likely to structure their 
development and evolution’ (Macnaghten, 2010, p.24). 
In this regard, the key finding was that where concerns 
arose they were often underpinned by conceptions of CCS 
and biofuels as, what we term, ‘non-transitions’– that is, 
they were viewed as approaches that defer, rather than 
solve, energy system problems, and as ‘short-term’ in 
their outlook. They were ‘non-transitional’ to the extent 
that they did not fit with the public conception of what 
a transition should be; i.e. it should involve change that 
addresses the root cause of issues. This combined with 
an underlying set of expectations that could be described 
as something akin to technological pessimism (defined 
below), as opposed to the optimism characteristic of 
engagements with some technologies (on optimism see 
for example Jasanoff, 2003; Welsh, 1990). 
It is important to state that this section focuses on factors 
that underpin discourses of contestation and concern and 
should not be taken to suggest that there were no positive 
narratives around these components of energy system 
change. The interest here is to explicate and interrogate 
the basis of negative responses as these give insights in to 
the potential for future contestation. In the following, we 
first discuss narratives of non-transition before moving 
on to navigate through discourses of (technological) 
pessimism.
Central to the notion of non-transitions is a strong and 
widely held public concern found across the groups about 
continued reliance on fossil fuels (oil, gas and coal). Fossil 
fuels, as supply options, evoked particularly negative 
responses in terms of their role in future energy systems. 
In general they were viewed as polluting, archaic, finite 
and as sources of global conflict. 
P: Hydrocarbons should not be used - not as a source  
of energy. Burning stuff to make energy is the wrong  
thing to do. (Cumbria) 
 
Such views also extended to unconventional fossil fuels 
(e.g. shale gas, deep sea oil), where the research indicates 
that further potential for extraction does not alter 
negative views with regard to their future role (see also 
Theme 2). Attitudes toward fossil fuels translated into an 
intuitive negativity about CCS and, to a lesser extent, bio-
energy, as they carried either direct connections (as in the 
CCS case) or associations (as in the bio-energy case). 
In relation to bio-energy, similarities were perceived in  
the ways that both energy sources entailed processes  
of burning natural resources. 
P: I think it’s because in my mind, I think burning rain 
forests and burning trees or whatever, so it is that 
association, and even though you’re replanting, and  
they are only planted for that reason, I’m still like…  
it doesn’t sound healthy. (Edinburgh)  
 
The key finding was that where 
concerns arose they were often 
underpinned by conceptions of 
CCS and biofuels as, what we 
term, ‘non-transitions’– that is, 
they were viewed as approaches 
that defer, rather than solve, 
energy system problems, and 
as ‘short-term’in their outlook.
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Fossil fuels and bio-energy were also related in 
discussions of the potential requirements for international 
imports – this opened up perceived possibilities for 
competition, global conflict, and injustice arising over the 
resource, akin to those associated with oil.
P: It’s another business. It’s another oil producing business 
that then becomes paramount to any other needs and bio 
fuels just become another monster. (Cumbria) 
 
Connections to fossil fuels were thus important in the 
manifestation of ‘non-transitions’ discourse around  
bio-fuels, as they were seen to hold potential for 
perpetuating similar problems. 
In the context of CCS the connections to fossil fuels 
are clear given that a key envisioned application of 
the technology is for fossil fuel power stations. In this 
regard, the non-transitions narrative involved the 
characterisation of CCS as ‘short term’ or as an approach 
that defers, rather than solves, existing problems 
associated with energy systems.
P: We have been using oil and gas and coal for years and 
years and we all know it creates smog and all the rest 
of it… It (CCS) is a cleaner version of that, but the issue 
is, as far as I see it, we are still using materials that will 
disappear if we carrying on the way we’re using them… it 
is a difficult one as we are still looking for oil and we may 
find some big new oil fields that will keep us going for 
a hundred years, but we are using the Earth’s resources 
which will run out, so although it’s cleaner it feels like it is 
a short term option… maybe just cleaning up as opposed 
to let’s look at this again and let’s look to the future longer 
term even beyond 2050. It will take a long time to build 
this infrastructure and all these resources are being eaten 
whereas there are other energy sources around us which 
feel a bit longer term, like the sun. (Cardiff)
P: I think if we go, start down that route of carbon  
storage, forever we will be down that track because it’s 
easy isn’t it? It’s an easy solution… but actually for  
me its cutting corners and forever we’ll be you know 
enslaved to it… (Cumbria) 
 
This notion of a “short-term solution” was also salient for 
biofuels, though not to the extent found in the CCS case. 
P: Yes, it feels like come on guys, we can do something 
better than that. I don’t know what it is about it, maybe 
it is because it’s just burning stuff, it doesn’t seem very 
sophisticated or sustainable and it seems like they have 
just panicked and said we’ll just burn stuff. (Cumbria) 
 
It is important to highlight that in general there was 
greater uncertainty about bio-fuels and as a consequence 
views were more ambivalent (i.e. people expressed 
conflicted or opposing ideas). This was in contrast to CCS 
where the direct connections to hydrocarbons resulted 
in a greater intensity and wider ranging expression of 
negative perspectives. A further key difference between 
the characterisations of CCS and bio-energy was that 
bio-fuels were seen to have potential in substituting fossil 
fuels. In this sense, when bio-fuels were contrasted with 
fossil fuels, rather than associated with them, a different 
narrative emerged – one that characterised concerns 
about bio-energy as a trade off with deeper concerns 
about fossil fuels. 
P: If the necessity came to it then we wouldn’t have much 
to say about it actually because when you point out that 
it is an absolute need or the alternative is offshore drilling, 
sea pollution like the Gulf of Mexico you know could 
happen here so if you spell out the alternatives to this  
you would have some sympathetic hearing. (Cardiff) 
 
There were further notable differences in perspective 
that arose regarding CCS when the idea of using the 
technology for emissions arising from industrial processes 
was introduced, and when notions of reuse were brought 
into view (see also Shackley, McLachlan and Gough, 
2004). Discussion about CCS in this context saw the 
technology dissociated from fossil fuels and instead 
associated with industry. Industry, and manufacturing 
in particular, were viewed (almost universally) as an 
important and necessary part of the UK’s economy and 
preferences on the whole were to increase manufacturing 
in the UK. This is discussed in more detail within Theme 
8 but for now the point to be made is that CCS in this 
context represented a solution to a problem arising from 
something that was otherwise regarded positively (i.e. 
industry). By contrast, in the case of CCS for the fossil fuel 
power sector, it addresses only one element (i.e. climate 
change) amongst a wide range of concerns relating to 
fossil fuels. 
The next explanatory theme of this section focuses on 
the notion of technological pessimism or, what has been 
termed, technological realism (Adam, 2010). This refers 
to an attitude which contrasts with that of technological 
optimism (see Jasanoff, 2003; Macnaghten, 2010; 
Markusson and Shackley, 2012) and relates principally to 
a sense that technological failure is always possible and 
that if the worst possible event is not acceptable then 
the action should be avoided (Adam, 2010). Technological 
pessimism (or realism) took a number of different forms 
in the data. For CCS, it related in part to expectations of 
inevitable technological failure. 
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P: See, I worry about that whenever humans try and 
transport something dangerous they always make an 
arse of it somewhere along the line, like oil. The damage 
we have done with big oil tankers spilling out, we would 
have to transport this (carbon dioxide) and store it and 
obviously I don’t know how that gets out, is it like a 
vapour or liquid or ice, I don’t know, but if you leave 
humans to transport something from a to b at some point 
of them doing that they will make a balls up and it could 
end up back in the environment. That is just my opinions 
on humans, but we always make an arse of it somewhere. 
(Edinburgh) 
 
Beyond this sense of inevitable technological failure, there 
was pessimism surrounding the processes of technological 
development for CCS and concerns about the inclusion 
of undeveloped or undemonstrated technologies within 
system scenarios.
P: If the technology’s [referring to CCS] not even available 
yet, even if you put that onto this calculation board or 
whatever [referring to the DECC my2050 calculator], it’s 
going to create a false reading isn’t it? Because it’s not 
actually available yet. It might perhaps be that in five 
years time we say, “Oh no, we can’t do it.” (Cumbria) 
 
Pessimism about socio-technical issues is connected to 
trust in the institutions and organisations responsible for 
control, regulation and so forth (see Wynne, 1996; Terwel 
et al. 2011). In this regard, historical experience of poorly 
managed risks, and problems associated with the wider 
energy sector, were drawn upon in the formulation of 
public characterisations of CCS and bio-fuels. For example, 
the deep sea oil disaster in the Gulf of Mexico or oil spills 
in general, formed one such point of reference. 
Bio-energy shared these forms of more pessimistic 
reaction but in different ways – i.e. expectations were 
for risks associated with biofuels to manifest but these 
were not necessarily about technology per se. Instead, 
pessimism related the social and political governance 
processes for bio-fuels grown specifically for energy 
purposes. 
P: It depends where they get it from. I understand they’re 
growing certain crops which took up farmland for  
growing food - that’s not the way to do it. (Cumbria) 
 
Such reservations about the use of land for growing 
energy crops were compounded by issues relating to trust 
(discussed in detail in Theme 3). In this instance, distrust 
toward energy related businesses, regarding particularly 
their profit driven motivations, resulted in mistrust about 
the extent to which biofuels would be managed in ways 
that did not create negative impacts associated with 
changes in land use. 
P: If it is recycled I have no problem with it, but if it is a 
crop that’s specifically grown for fuel then no, not when 
you’ve got starving Ethiopia or wherever else.
M: But what if it wasn’t on food crop land?
P: I think the figures would be fudged again because 
companies want to get wealthy. If everything is fuelled 
on this thing and then more land is needed… it is too 
dangerous to go down that route. (Cumbria) 
 
Though quite different from its emergence in talk about 
CCS, this type of discourse can still be seen as a form of 
pessimism, with the expectation for “things that can go 
wrong to go wrong” in the future of bio-energy. The key 
difference here, however, is that the pessimism is related 
not to socio-technological failure but to the expectation 
for failure of socio-political decision-making, regulation 
and industry in ensuring responsible growing, sourcing 
and supply. 
Discourses of trust have long been recognised as 
important in public engagement with socio-technical or 
environmental risk issues (e.g. Wynne, 1996; Poortinga 
and Pidgeon, 2003). Wynne for example, has argued that 
responses to socio-technical issues are often rooted 
in judgements about the trustworthiness of expert 
institutions – characterised as ‘those that are supposed 
to control the risk processes involved’ (1996 p.57). In 
discussing CCS and bio-energy participants frequently 
related their more negative conceptions to feelings of 
distrust in both government and industry. 
P: I think it would be the safety aspect, we don’t know 
enough about it, except what the government tell us, the 
government won’t tell the ordinary punter anything that 
they don’t need to know. (Glasgow) 
 
In processes of deploying bio-energy and CCS within 
future energy systems, trust is thus likely to be an 
important issue in the emergence of contestation. 
Deliberating Energy System Transitions in the UK   33 
Transforming the UK Energy System: Public Values, Attitudes and Acceptability 
In this section, concepts of ‘non-transitions’ and ‘socio-
technological pessimism’ have formed an organising 
principle for unpacking our participant’s discourse with 
regard to CCS and bio-energy. The analysis offers insights 
regarding how within public understandings links are 
formed between fossil fuels and these energy system 
options, which contributes to a sense that they represent a 
short-term “fix”. We also show how a sense of pessimism 
about both socio-technical and governance failure runs 
through public discourse, contributing to concern about 
these proposed elements of system change. 
As noted at the beginning of the theme, this analysis does 
not incorporate discussion of all the characterisations of 
these issues that arose through the analysis. Rather, we 
focus on the underlying concerns that foregrounded the 
more negative public perspectives across the groups. That 
said these aspects of system change were notable for their 
potential to evoke contestation and for the connections 
that were made with fossil fuels. Nuclear and wind energy 
can also be included in the list of energy technologies that 
evoked contestation, but these were not related to fossil 
fuels and brought a different set of concerns (discussed 
elsewhere – e.g. see Theme 4 and 6). The general 
conclusion to be drawn from this theme is that, any socio-
technical options, beyond bio-energy and CCS, that entail 
high consequence risks (technological, political and/or 
social) and also hold non-transitional qualities, have the 
potential to evoke contestation and public concern.
Some elements of energy system change (e.g. CCS) 
were intricately associated with notions of inevitable 
technological failure. There were concerns about 
the inclusion of undeveloped or undemonstrated 
technologies within system scenarios.
Bio-energy is viewed differently to other renewable 
forms of energy. At times it was more closely 
related to fossil fuels as both energy sources entail 
processes of burning natural resources.
T6: Energy Matters in Place: Politics, (In)action 
and Control
One of the aims of the project has been to explore the 
relevance of place and context for public perspectives 
on energy system transitions. This was connected to 
the objective of developing insights into public views on 
everyday lifestyle changes implicated in different energy 
system scenarios. In this theme, we thus bring a focus on 
those aspects of our participant’s discourse pertaining 
to how they considered transitions might manifest 
within their everyday lives, and the issues they foresaw 
that were particular to the places in which they lived. 
Discussion centres on the ways that place may facilitate 
or disrupt the implementation of an intervention, ranging 
from infrastructure siting to demand side management. 
We explore whether or not our participants felt the 
intervention in question was suited to their area, how 
socio-cultural histories of place are relevant to views on 
transitions, and the implications of social constructions 
of the home for enacting change. As such the spaces 
and places in question are at multiple scales, including 
national, regional and the very local. 
To talk of transitions as a singular united event or vision 
grossly simplifies the complexity of change and obscures 
the importance of understanding how they will manifest 
in place. Choosing areas with different characteristics 
from more rural to more urban, and participants with 
varied lifestyles and circumstances allows us to explore 
whether or not publics feel the changes being proposed 
are suitable to their area and way of life. Participants 
from both rural and urban areas felt, at times, that the 
proposed change was either not suited to their area or, 
perhaps more crucially, threatened their way of life. For 
those living in more rural areas, one example was the 
envisioned shift toward using more public transport:
P1: It [increased use of public transport on the DECC 
My2050 tool] is not very feasible for any of us… And 
that’s not us passing the buck – it’s horses for courses, we 
don’t have that option but if it was available we would.
[…]
P2: In my case 20% of journeys would be a hell of a 
change.
P1: But we are talking about UK as a whole and not us  
as an individual special needs area.
P2: It will still be difficult in a rural area – we’ve got to 
rely on bus services, as you say, or arrangements with  
our neighbours.
P3: I think cities can definitely be public transport if they 
sort the systems out, put in electrical trams… you know… 
Edinburgh [laughter from group]. (Cumbria) 
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A second transport related example was the concern 
raised by rural dwellers that electric cars would not be 
able to perform adequately in hilly areas. Such anxieties 
about the performance of electric vehicles are distinct 
from other concerns, such as the more well known “range 
anxiety”, which our participants also engaged with 
(see Theme 4). Both forms of anxiety underpinned the 
perception for some that electric vehicles would be ill-
suited to rural areas, conversely they were often deemed 
as most appropriate for travel within cities.
Urban dwellers would, by contrast, point to building forms 
more typical of city life – including flats, apartments 
and tenements – and suggest that some envisioned 
changes are more suited to private detached or semi-
detached buildings. There were two sets of reasons for 
this assertion. First, our participants argued that changes, 
such as installing insulation or solar panels, would be 
intractably difficult due to the sheer number of owners or 
occupiers that would need to be consulted in, for example, 
an apartment complex. Second, the compressed and more 
intense living arrangements per capita typical of urban 
dwelling was seen as a key constraint for implementing 
certain types of demand side management techniques.
P: ...as I say I wouldn’t mind putting mine on during the 
night but just with the fact the girl that stays upstairs has 
a wee baby about 3, so I wouldn’t even dream of putting 
the washing machine on because it sounds like a rocket 
taking off at 2 o’clock in the morning… (Edinburgh) 
 
In both rural and urban locations, some participants 
pointed to the importance of preserving our built heritage. 
It was noted, however, that policies and regulations aimed 
at conserving our built environment may be at odds with 
those implicated in energy system transitions.
P: You would imagine that new builds will have it 
[insulation] as standard, but they will probably have 
to start cutting out the red tape for people that want to 
insulate homes, like for instance in Edinburgh where 
almost every home is listed, and you can’t do anything 
to them, so they need to cut the regulations and say 
insulation is top priority. (Edinburgh) 
 
This connects with the earlier discussions in theme 2 and 
3 about institutional body language (Wynne, 1996) and 
the messages that public(s) perceive from government 
with regard to energy system change (i.e. experiences in 
everyday life do not correspond with formal messaging 
from government about transitions). Currently, building 
regulations that prioritise heritage over energy efficiency 
may be seen by some to imply that policy makers do not 
consider retrofitting to be a priority.
It is important to note that the materialities and 
infrastructures of place did not only serve as a perceived 
constraint on change. Participants would also point 
to specific examples of “places” that represented good 
examples of how a change could be implemented. For 
instance, London was for many a positive example of a 
well-developed public transport system, this included 
references to “Boris Johnson’s cycle thing” (Cumbria). With 
regard to siting, even participants who classed themselves 
as anti-onshore wind farms impressed that there are 
appropriate locations for onshore wind developments (i.e. 
where the turbines add to, or at least do not detract from, 
the visual amenity or character of the area). This was 
particularly true of the participants that were sampled 
from around Whitelee wind farm. 
P1: They can be very intrusive, the wind farms if you live 
in a small community, they can be very intrusive. That’s 
just my idea.
P2: Well I actually think like yourself that the Fenwick 
Moor is a desolate place and as far as I care, they can put 
as many wind farms as they like [murmurs of agreement 
from others].
P1: That’s okay on Fenwick Moor, yes but where my 
relations live it’s very intrusive. (Glasgow) 
 
Understanding the ways in which different places and 
particular developments are socially constructed is 
vital to interpreting what people view as appropriate 
for their areas. Previous research has shown how social 
constructions of place can act to informally regulate space 
(Cresswell, 1996; Parkhill, 2007). That is to say, space is 
regulated as much by what we consider as appropriate 
in particular places, as it is by formal governance 
procedures (e.g. think about the differences between what 
is deemed appropriate in a club environment and what 
is appropriate in a library). Such processes of informal 
regulation permeate multiple aspects of everyday life and 
are relevant for thinking about spaces, from landscapes  
to homes. 
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If an act or development is perceived as contravening 
or transgressing these unwritten rules about what is 
appropriate within particular spaces, then contestation 
is likely to occur. Social constructions of space (i.e. the 
meanings, perceptions and ways we think about spaces 
and places) are developed not just through our experience 
of the space now, but also through the socio-cultural 
histories of the place and our experiences of other areas 
(on space, place and relationality across time and space 
see Massey, 2005). We now wish to explore the important 
ways socio-cultural histories of place impacted on our 
participants’ thoughts about energy system change.
We have discussed in Theme 5 negative perceptions of 
CCS in general but there were concerns with regard to this 
technology that were particular to our participants within 
the groups conducted in Scotland. Our participants in 
Scotland had reservations about some of the proposals for 
CCS, specifically the idea that carbon may be stored in the 
now depleted oil reserves off the Scottish coast under the 
North Sea. Centrally, participants struggled to see what 
benefits this industry would bring to Scotland. Rather 
than viewing it as an opportunity to develop further an 
existing industry, our participants expressed concern 
that Scotland would be viewed unfavourably for hosting 
storage facilities. 
P: I really don’t think we want to be the dustbin of the 
world for that kind of thing… [several lines omitted] …
keeping all this carbon for the rest of the world. (Glasgow) 
 
Indeed, some Scottish participants expressed the view 
that Scotland is repeatedly treated as a “guinea pig” 
(Glasgow), marginalised by the English through the 
imposition of unfavourable developments and policies. 
Such participants called upon a range of examples as 
evidence of marginalisation including: nuclear waste 
repository proposals; piloting of the poll tax scheme in  
the 1990s by the Conservative Government; and stories  
of toxic waste dumping stemming from the London 
Olympic games. 
It was not only CCS that engendered concerns of 
marginalisation and, environmental and social injustice. 
There were also issues in this regard connected to onshore 
wind development in Scotland.
P1: I think that is Scotland’s heritage that’s getting 
destroyed for these turbines. I know everyone is saying 
that it’s for the electricity and that it’ll save in the long 
run but, you know, these trees, some of them have been 
here for…
P2: …hundreds of years…
P1: …hundreds of thousands of years, you know and if 
they’re taking them down and destroying them for these 
great big ugly monstrosities of things…
P3: [shaking head] I’m quite sure the trees will be rolling 
and greetin’ [meaning crying] when he sees the man with 
the chainsaw. (Glasgow)
Welsh participants also suggested that Wales has been 
marginalised, particularly in relation to the siting of 
onshore wind. A key source of contention for participants 
in both Scotland and Wales is that many of the policy 
decisions appear to be taken by Westminster, rather than 
their devolved governments. 
P: …so maybe they would have a bit more thought for 
the Welsh people… we are second-class citizens…when 
we became one with England we lost, we became the 
poor relations, and they are making decisions in London 
for Wales. They are not living in Wales, how the heck 
would they know what Wales needs, they are just making 
assumptions on what they think we need, on what really 
is what England needs, not what Wales needs. (Merthyr) 
 
Beyond issues related to the important questions raised 
about environmental and social injustice, such narratives 
have significant consequences for policy development 
and implementation. Possibly the devolved governments 
of Scotland and Wales need to do more to distinguish 
whether or not they support policies flowing out of 
Westminster, including delineating how they envision 
such policies might benefit their constituents. Equally, this 
would also suggest that the UK government must make 
clearer how their energy strategy incorporates concerns  
of citizens living in devolved administrations. 
Transitions were not only viewed as holding potential for 
negative consequences in terms of how a region or person 
may be disempowered. Some of our Scottish participants 
also saw some proposed system changes as a means to 
transition out of marginalisation. This included, by way  
of contrast to the concerns discussed above about impacts 
on Scottish natural heritage, positive perspectives on the 
continued development of wind and wave power as an 
exportable resource to England. Indeed, the technological 
development of wave and wind power was seen as a 
means of stimulating Scottish industry and generating 
perceptions of Scotland as a European force. 
P: Wave power and wind power, these are the big 
thing now for Scotland, they are massive [murmurs of 
agreement from others] so I don’t know what England 
is doing but we are into it big time… Now the [wave] 
technology is not complete or anything but they think 
they could take over Europe that’s what Alex Salmond 
[Scottish First Minister] is talking about. (Edinburgh) 
So far in this section we have discussed how our 
participants deliberated on energy matters and energy 
system transformation at the meso and macro scale. 
We now wish to turn to the micro and explore how the 
potential transformation of energy practices in the  
home was viewed.
Central to social constructions of the home was the 
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notion of it being a private space, and for our participants 
this came with the expectation that it should be free from 
governmental control. As such, measures or changes 
proposed that were felt to erode the power and control 
of householders within their homes frequently met 
with stiff resistance. This arose with some force out of 
discussions around particular demand management 
techniques. For example, demand management that could 
lead to more automation, with those outside the home – 
be it energy companies or another body – able to access 
‘private’ information or manipulate the running of certain 
appliances, provoked strong negative reactions from most 
participants. Indeed, participants characterised the type 
of society that would allow such penetration of the private 
sphere as being, for example, “draconian”, “sinister”, 
“autocratic”, “intrusive”, a “police state”, “nanny state”, 
“1984” or “Big Brother”. 
P: I’d quite object if somebody else had that control…I find 
that a bit draconian actually…It’s a bit like George Orwell, 
that…”It has decreed you must have”, that really annoys 
me. (Glasgow) 
 
In essence, for those that had concerns about demand 
management, the proposed hypothetical measures were 
seen as an intrusive imposition, leaving householders 
vulnerable to potential abuses of power by those in 
control. This latter point represents a core element of the 
concerns that arose with regard to demand management – 
i.e. that it evoked imaginings of potential futures whereby 
the forms of power it would facilitate come to be used 
for purposes other than that intended in their inception. 
This connects with issues around trust, (discussed in 
other themes) as our participants felt energy companies 
in particular may abuse the situation, for example by 
trying to maximise the amount of energy used given their 
current business models and profit making orientation 
(see Theme 3).
A further key concern of participants was that such a 
system would not be flexible enough to account for the 
patterns of everyday life. Earlier in this theme we noted 
how the different materialities of place are sometimes 
seen as not being amenable to shifting some patterns of 
demand (e.g. washing clothes late at night). Participants 
suggested there was potential for the neglect of such 
concerns within energy system change, if variation in 
living contexts and the dynamism of everyday life as it is 
experienced are not taken into account. 
Despite the presence of these more negative discourses 
about automation, it was not necessarily always opposed. 
Indeed, some participants felt further automation (e.g. in 
relation to turning things on and off) could be helpful in 
the co-ordination of their everyday lives. Important, in this 
regard, was that householders were afforded autonomy 
and the ability to override control of the automation – that 
ultimately they, rather than an ‘outside’ group, had control. 
In sum, automation with limits was regarded as far more 
preferable to externally controlled demand management. 
P: I agree, the thought of putting our washing machine on 
overnight is not difficult, but as long as you had the option 
to be able to run it at other times if you wanted to, you 
know, you weren’t only restricted to using it overnight, 
and as long as you had safe appliances because my 
husband’s nephew and his wife recently lost their home 
when their tumble drier caught on fire in the middle of the 
night. (Merthyr) 
 
The preferred method of demand management was one 
that would allow householders to maintain a level of 
control. Interventions that assisted people in shifting their 
own energy use patterns were supported, for example, 
being advised to use an appliance when energy supply 
was predicted to be plentiful. In part, our participants 
seemed resistant to ceding responsibility for demand 
management. 
P1: I think we need to be educated about energy levels, 
electricity levels rather than having to knock them off – 
you know?
P2: I think it’s a trust thing.
P1: Saying, you’d be educating everybody to be conscious 
of the amount of electric that they’re using in their 
household, rather than think “ah we needn’t bother I’ll go 
to bed and let the company knock it off”.
M: So you’re being more responsible?
P1: Yeah you’d feel a better sense of responsibility thinking 
well no I’m not going to let them do it, I’m going to do 
it myself and I’m going to make sure it’s knocked off… 
(Cumbria)
A slight reservation about this form of demand 
management was, however, whether or not information 
on predictions would be reliable regarding for example 
levels of wind generation. Participants questioned 
if weather forecasting was reliable enough to base a 
demand management system on and, if not, who might 
be penalised in the event that things go wrong. 
P1: So maybe they’ll say there’s going to be a lot of wind 
and it doesn’t turn up and then you put your washing 
machine to use low energy…
P2: And it uses more –
P1: …and it’s not. It uses more because the wind hasn’t 
arrived, you know. [laughter from the group]. (Merthyr 
 
The reliability of the service and issues around safety of 
Measures or changes proposed 
that were felt to erode the power 
and control of householders 
within their homes frequently 
met with stiff resistance.
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appliances are illustrative of reservations and concerns 
about the technologies and services underpinning some 
of these ideas (also see Theme 5), rather than the idea 
of demand management in general. As a final point, it 
also became clear that some of the proposals regarding 
demand levelling were seen as similar to services 
available today (e.g. broadband limits, sensors turning 
computers and TVs off). As such, this relative familiarity 
may, in part, account for some of the qualified support  
we found for such measures.
Often the importance of place and space in discourses 
surrounding energy system change is reduced to ‘siting’ 
issues. Whilst not dismissing the importance of siting 
at multiple spatial scales, in this theme we also wanted 
to show how place is important for energy system 
transitions beyond concerns about changes to landscapes. 
With this in mind, we have examined how perspectives on 
transitions connect with our material relations with space, 
both in the past, present and future, and how they relate 
to our lives and ways of living. The theme has further 
explored how place is associated with socio-cultural and 
political issues (including trust, control, histories, power, 
regulation, imposition and so forth), and how they are, in 
turn, connected to places. The core message arising from 
this theme is that to ignore the multi-faceted dimensions 
of how place matters is to risk controversy and 
contestation, as well as missed opportunities for learning 
from mistakes and building upon past successes. 
Participants from both rural and urban areas felt, 
at times, that the proposed change was either not 
suited to their area or, perhaps more crucially, 
threatened their way of life.
The devolved governments need to do more to 
distinguish whether or not they support UK level 
policies; including outlining how they envision such 
policies might benefit their constituents. Equally, the 
UK government must make clearer how their energy 
strategy incorporates concerns of citizens living in 
devolved administrations. To do otherwise risks 
some people and places being marginalised.
T7: Accessing Energy Futures: Challenges  
and Opportunities
The ways in which people imagine their socio-
technological futures can have the powerful effect of 
enabling or constraining new ways of thinking, acting,  
and being in the world. Wide-ranging works across 
different disciplines have highlighted the significance  
of how we imagine and think about future change in 
setting the parameters for what can and does happen  
(e.g. Mcdowall and Eames, 2006; Mason, 2006). Though this 
work has often focused on the imaginaries of scientists, 
policy makers or industrialists in driving technological 
innovation, there is some evidence that directs us to 
consider the importance of public imaginaries in making 
possible particular forms of change. For example, Jones 
(2011) has pointed to the importance of the circulation 
of ideas about and experiences of anthracite coal as time 
saving, more convenient and cheaper in the uptake of the 
fuel source in the US residential sector. Importantly, Jones 
also points out that the residential sector formed a key, if 
not the primary, market for the development of the coal 
industry in both the US and Europe, and was thus integral 
to this historical transition. 
Given this, people’s imaginaries, expectations, experiences 
and ideas about technological futures can be seen as 
highly important in understanding the challenges 
and opportunities that exist for new transitions being 
envisioned now. This theme takes in discussion of our 
participant’s ways of characterising future systems 
and future change, the difficulties they found, and the 
resources they drew upon to make sense of futures 
and formulate their views. Importantly the section 
also examines some of the implications of these public 
imaginaries for key aspects of energy system transitions. 
Within existing research several different concepts have 
been developed to describe the ways that people draw 
upon familiar cultural and social resources in order to 
make sense of new phenomena. In particular notions of 
frames, framing (e.g. Schon and Reid, 1994; Miller, 2000; 
Jasanoff and Wynne, 1998) and anchoring (Moscovici, 
1984) have earned popular appeal. In the first part of 
this section, the analysis is focused on the frames our 
participant’s used for imagining futures (e.g. thinking 
backwards in time to think forward, and the use of science 
fiction), and the existing social ideas they used to anchor 
views about things which are yet to be (e.g. Economy 7  
for electric heating, petrol cars for electric cars). 
In line with previous research on other areas of 
socio-technical change (cf. Brown and Michael, 2003; 
Macnaghten, 2010), we found that participants drew 
upon their own experiences of, for example, existing 
technologies or particular aspects of social systems in 
order to think through into the future and generate a 
sense of how they might feel about different aspects 
of change. One area, in which this arose as particularly 
salient, in terms of the implications for achieving system 
change, was in relation to electrification. 
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Given current understanding of the significance 
of familiarity in visions of acceptable transitions/
developments (e.g. see Butler et al. 2011; Parkhill et 
al. 2010), we might expect that existing experience 
of electricity would be a positive factor in moves to 
electrification. Through the research, however, we found  
a set of quite negative experiences and more general ideas 
around existing electric heating and cooking systems  
and (to a lesser extent) electric cars that had an impact 
on how transitions to electrification were viewed. This is 
despite the fact that future electric systems are likely to 
differ in quite significant ways compared with what has 
come before (e.g. heat pumps compared with Economy 
7 electric wall heaters). In order to situate the idea of 
transitioning to all electric systems, participants in the 
research frequently invoked experiences of existing 
electric and gas central heating systems. 
P: I had that [electric heating] in a previous home and I 
thought that was terrible, it wasn’t cost effective, it wasn’t 
quick enough…The gas is effective, quick and that is 
what you need in this day and age, to use what you need. 
(Glasgow) 
 
This last extract also hints at how electric heating was 
framed as a technology of the past, rather than the 
future, and though ‘going back’ was not necessarily 
viewed negatively (see Theme 2), it contributed to a wider 
sense that it may not be an improvement on current 
systems. Overall, the research findings are indicative of 
the circulation of ideas about electric heating systems, in 
particular, as expensive, not controllable, non-responsive 
and ineffective. 
P1: You see when we were little we had the storage 
heaters, the brick in. And the electric used to take 24 hours 
to heat the blooming things up. 
P2: Yeah.
P1: And I think that that image is ingrained in people’s 
heads and they don’t want to go backwards, that puts 
them off, the electricity aspect. Because gas is quicker,  
it comes out quicker, it heats up quicker… (Cumbria) 
 
These types of ideas about electrification of heat mark 
out what is likely to be an important challenge in 
delivering transitions toward electric systems. This 
should be regarded as particularly important given the 
significant role that the circulation of such ideas is likely 
to play in the uptake of new forms of residential heating 
systems. Historical examples provide an indication of 
the importance of new forms of heat provisioning being 
viewed as ‘improvement’ in processes of household level 
transitions (e.g. on historical heat transitions see Jones, 
2011; on ‘improvement’ see also Theme 2). The perceptions 
found in this research of electric heating as expensive, 
poorly performing and lacking the controllability of gas 
fired systems, could well prove deeply problematic in 
efforts to move to electrified systems. 
In some senses we might see such discourse about gas 
central heating as conflicting with the data presented 
in previous sections where fossil fuels (in general) were 
viewed negatively and shifts away from oil, gas and coal 
were seen as necessary. Important in this regard is that 
it is the characteristics of any given system (e.g. cost, 
controllability, responsiveness, safety and so forth) that 
are central to the construction of preferences, rather than 
the energy source itself. Crucial to transitions, then, is the 
delivery of similar (or ideally improved) characteristics in 
heating, transport or cooking systems regardless of the 
particular energy source. 
P: I’m easy if it is gas or electricity, I’m not really 
bothered where the source of my heating and everything 
comes from. I couldn’t care if it came from a pile of shite 
outside to be honest, as long as I have still got the same 
autonomy over when it’s hot and when it’s cold, as long 
as everything’s exactly the same as what I have got now 
with the reliability and when I can put it on or not, I’m 
happy and I’m not really bothered where it comes from 
as long as it’s cheaper and better for the environment. 
(Edinburgh)  
 
There is still significant work to be done, however, in 
developing future imaginaries of different modes of 
provisioning that carry these ideas of improvement. At 
present, though technologies may be developing in ways 
that can offer the characteristics on which importance 
is placed, the ideas that exist about such technologies 
are not yet aligned. Bringing more positive ideas about 
the characteristics of electric systems into circulation 
represents an important challenge. The research is 
indicative of a lack of these positive future imaginaries  
in public discourse at present. 
In current policy greater efficiency in gas central heating 
is being pursued along-side promotion of electricity 
(see DECC, 2012; also Hoggett et al. 2011). Though this 
is consistent with ideas embedded in scenarios, which 
depict continuing improvements in efficiency up to 
2020 with more significant moves to electricity in the 
2030s, it does not yet incorporate consideration of the 
work required over time to bring long term visions 
about electrification into public consciousness. Given 
the juxtaposition between gas and electricity that many 
made throughout the groups, the continuing emphasis on 
greater efficiency for gas central heating systems could 
work against longer term efforts to develop uptake of 
new forms of heating system, particularly for the retrofit 
agenda where replacement is likely only to be undertaken 
based on necessity. 
P: I think [refers to other participant] is right, people 
are being told different things. I watch a lot of home 
improvement shows and they always say upgrade the 
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boiler to an energy efficient combi-boiler. If you are trying 
to encourage people to go to electric shouldn’t they be 
telling them to do that rather than install something 
which will cost 5-6 grand to have it installed when 20 
years down the line you might not have any gas to 
use it? It is mixed messages getting people to actually 
understand why they should be doing something with 
the bigger picture. I doubt most people will actually sit 
down and talk about it properly, they will just take what 
they think are the facts like in the 70’s electric was more 
expensive but perhaps they don’t know. (Cardiff) 
 
Existing experiences and ideas were, in general, 
an important part of the processes through which 
participants in the research made sense of energy system 
transitions. We find further examples of similar processes 
of anchoring in discourses around other technologies, 
like carbon capture and storage (connected by some to 
nuclear waste storage), and in the construction of views 
about transition more generally. In the example below, the 
participant uses the analogy of a gastric band to anchor 
his views on carbon capture and storage and approaches 
to transition more generally. 
M: But to avoid climate change, is it worth having bit of 
carbon capture and storage? Would you relax on that a 
little bit?
P: If the other stuff wasn’t working but only as a last 
resort? …I wouldn’t, because it’s not, I don’t think it’s, 
it’s not, you’re not changing. Like if you were super obese 
and they say to you like they give you a gastric band 
or whatever but if you keep eating a lot the stomach 
stretches and you’re back to where you were. Whereas 
if you learnt to eat healthily and make changes in life… 
(Cumbria) 
 
A closely related sense making tool that participants 
frequently used to engage with futures involved thinking 
backwards in time in order to think forward. This 
included the use of examples from the past (such as the 
technological development of televisions) to reference 
how the future might manifest, how transitions might (or 
might not) happen. 
P1: …a flat screen TV, which most of us have now, we 
don’t have these big clumpy things, five years ago you 
wouldn’t have, even though they were around. They have 
now become cheaper as they are making them mass 
produced and the components become cheaper and more 
accessible and that is where the [electric] car is.
P2: Yeah but I can go into a supermarket and see the 
latest television as they are there in front of me, I wouldn’t 
walk around a garage and see what cars were available if 
I wasn’t going to change it. (Cardiff) 
 
In the quotes above we find examples of past change 
being used to imagine the possibilities for future change. 
We also find discourse that problematises change when 
Participant 2 highlights the difference between buying 
cars and buying televisions. Here this participant denotes 
how expensive items like cars are (for most people) rarely 
changed and are a special purchase, inferring that the 
time required for change of transport systems is likely to 
be significantly longer than that of televisions. In this way 
they raise issues with comparison across technological 
forms in imagining the possibilities for transitions. This 
mode of future engagement also found form through 
reference to science fiction and it’s manifestation in  
“real life”. 
P: …a lot of the things that I’ve read in [science fiction] 
books years ago are now fact (Cumbria) 
 
Anchoring in this way thus provided a source of optimism, 
but it also represented a basis for expression of views 
related to the limits of technological development.
P: Surely, by then [2050]... We haven’t got pills for our 
meals yet and that was promised to us [laughter from 
group]. We’ve got mobile phones that are all-singing and 
all-dancing and can do everything but make a phone call 
because you haven’t got a signal… (Cumbria) 
Thus far we have discussed the role of anchoring and 
framing in how people formulate views about futures. 
This directs us to consider a number of more general 
issues with regard to public attitudes and acceptability of 
system change. First, visions of change need to resonate 
with and respond to existing cultural frames and ideals 
about futures in order for them to be taken up. Second, it 
is important to pay attention to the ways that different 
processes of transition and particular technological 
forms are anchored and understood by publics – novel 
approaches are not ‘filling a hole’ but are entering into 
existing meanings and frames. This means that framing 
something in a particular way through the information 
provided or the marketing of an approach will not always 
have the intended effects because it is incorporated into 
prior frames and linked to existing ideas that circulate in 
any given society.  
The analysis now turns to discourses that pertain 
explicitly to imagining different types of futures. We found 
discourses of apocalyptic futures, of draconian futures, 
open futures, and highly technological futures. We also 
found slipperiness between imaginaries of utopic futures 
and distopic futures. Indeed, futures of the kind depicted 
in contemporary scenarios were difficult for many of the 
participants in the research to engage with or to anticipate 
as possible, plausible or probable. This manifested in 
difficulties people found in connecting up the present 
with the future and extending into distant futures. 
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P: …I want that to be a better world for people but in a 
selfish way I feel it is so far away that it is never going to 
happen anyway. It is kind of like when someone says that 
2012 is when we are all going to die, I know it was silly, 
but I still thought that is miles away. (London) 
 
It also arose through the difficulty that people found in 
imagining the level of change proposed to meet the targets 
within the 2050 timescale. 
P: That [electrification of heat] is not going to happen 
overnight, or even over the next 38 years. It seems an 
awful long way away, but… the next stage up [referring 
to DECC MY2050 tool level] in the time span we have got 
and for the whole infrastructure to have to change is a 
massive, massive job. (Cardiff) 
 
These difficulties in imagining change were, as the above 
extracts suggest, related to the participant’s understanding 
of the complexity of energy system transitions, the need 
to overcome ‘gatekeepers’ of change (e.g. incumbents in 
the energy sector), and difficulties associated with the 
financing of transitions (both in terms of private and 
public investments at all scales – from household level to 
power station and network infrastructure), particularly in 
the current economic context. 
As part of the research, scenario narratives were employed 
as a further means of engaging publics in the workshops 
with different futures. The narratives were “Business as 
Usual” (or do nothing), “Mixing it Up” and “Low Carbon 
Living”. Responses to the scenario narratives provoked 
a different set of discourses about futures. They drew 
out concerns about futures but also brought into view 
discourses relating to the different types of futures that 
participants could envisage. Interestingly, but perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the scenario narrative that depicted a 
world where nothing had been done to address climate 
change and energy issues was more easily imaginable (if 
concerning) for many of the participants. 
P1: Parts of it are depressing because some of it can be 
compared to today. Some of it you can actually say is like 
the present time rather than in 2050
P2: Yeah we are not that far away really.
P1: I mean, looking at this it only seems as though it’s a 
few years down the line, it doesn’t seem that far away, 
and like reading about getting children to school and 
the congestion, that’s already happening, I mean that’s 
already happening now, all the different prices going up, 
that’s already happening now, so it just goes to show it is 
progressively getting worse and by 2050, this sounds mild 
to what I envisage it should be, going from what we’ve 
said today. (Merthyr) 
 
Though this represented an easily imaginable future 
primarily because of its similarity with present systems, 
it was a whole heartedly undesirable future and one 
that participants across all the groups felt either should 
or would be averted. In this sense it was very impactful 
and generated a strong reaction from participants (see 
also Theme 1). It is worth highlighting, however, that 
the discussion around approaches to future change and 
solutions to contemporary problems, which formed the 
primary focus of the workshops, proved more engaging, 
in many senses, than the presentation of an unchanged 
future. 
P: …when I sat in that other room it was so positive, 
we were chatting away talking about things we could 
fix, things we could sort, transport situation, batteries, 
cars, wave power, wind power that was very much what 
we were talking about. This took me back a little bit. 
(Edinburgh) 
 
Both the “Mixing it Up” and the “Low Carbon Living” 
scenario proved more difficult imaginaries for people to 
relate to but also represented (albeit in different ways) 
future imaginaries that were desirable for participants. 
The difficulties arose primarily through the feeling for 
many participants that the futures represented were too 
sanitised or too much like “utopia” so that they aroused 
suspicion and a sense that something more sinister was 
lurking beneath the surface of the worlds depicted. 
P1: a bit Stepford Wives
P2: you’ve taken all, it’s like as if you’ve got, not a total 
Aryan regime, but it’s like as if you’ve got this, you’ve got 
this thinking and everybody’s uniform in this thinking...
P1: It is like The Prisoner [referring to a 1960’s cult science 
fiction television programme]. (Merthyr)
P: On the surface it is very Utopian… it’s almost, it is very 
1984ish in certain parts where you are told you can put 
your washing on at two o’clock this morning, there is a 
slightly sinister edge to this underneath it. (London) 
 
Equally, for some they represented too technologically 
driven images of the future – a consequence perhaps of 
basing them on existing scenario work that tends to be 
technologically focused: 
P: It is daft isn’t it, it is like it’s going a bit space age isn’t 
it? (Merthyr) 
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Within the scenario narratives, there were certain aspects 
of future imaginaries that participants on the whole 
resisted quite strongly. In the “Mixing it Up” scenario, 
many excepted nuclear energy and carbon capture and 
storage from their generally positive responses to the 
scenario: 
P1: That was so much better than the last one, but it feels 
like the Jetsons a bit.
P2: I love this world and I want to live there
P3: Everything is good
P4: Apart from the nuclear power station [murmurs of 
agreement from the group]
P2: Aye
P4: I like it, apart from the nuclear power station and the 
carbon capture. (Edinburgh) 
 
In the “Low Carbon Living” scenario giving up flying for 
leisure and eating less meat were two aspects of imagined 
futures presented to the participants that provoked 
consistently strong reactions. 
P1: I think that… we don’t want to just exist we want to 
live… we want to be able to do things like develop, we 
want to be able to explore, we want to visit new places. 
We want to be able to eat food and enjoy it you know? 
That’s part of what living is about. And if we, if we for 
the sake of trying to save our environment we’ve robbed 
ourselves of life I think we’ve lost something that’s, you 
know, essential.
P2: Yeah but if we don’t look after our environment we’ve 
got no sense of life anyway.
P1: Indeed but what I’m trying to say is that we’ve got to 
try and bring it in balance. You know, when you’re talking 
about like not eating meat and not flying… for me you 
know living and exploring and pushing boundaries is 
something that’s really important to what makes us who 
we are. So I think that we’ve got to allow that to be part 
of the mix going forward as well. (Cumbria) 
 
Feelings about flying were very different depending on 
whether it was for business or for leisure. Travelling 
to different countries and the opportunities to live 
in different parts of the world were highly valued by 
participants. Though travelling for business was viewed as 
important in some instances, there was a general sense 
that flights for business should be significantly reduced. 
In contrast, notions of reducing flights for personal forms 
of travel were fiercely resisted. We posit that this is related 
to the underlying things that are embedded within 
ideas about this form of travel more generally (i.e. social 
interaction, cosmopolitanism, relaxation, ‘experience’ and 
so forth). Notions of giving up meat that were introduced 
to the participants through the workshops evoked equally 
strong reactions that we explain similarly as reactions 
to the things that meat invokes (i.e. social interaction 
through meal times, enjoyment, pleasure and so forth), 
rather than being about meat per se. Feelings about these 
aspects of life are also intimately linked with people’s 
sense of their own identity and, as such, may be difficult  
to shift or change. 
Reactions to ideas about reducing meat and flying, then, 
can be seen as reactions to perceived attacks on things 
that are greatly valued (like cultural experiences, fun and 
pleasure), rather than purely being about the phenomena 
of meat and flying alone. Such responses can also be 
seen as connected to the unspoken reciprocal social 
contracts between state and citizens. That is to say, taking 
holidays, relaxing and eating form core parts of the things 
people expect to be able to enjoy in return for their ‘good’ 
citizenship – for working, for paying taxes and so on. 
P: …Tenerife, I go a lot and the States… I am a retired 
lady now and I worked all my life, every day of my life, 
and now I think, “well I should just enjoy myself” so I do. 
(Glasgow) 
 
This directs us again to think of encouraging change 
in these areas as being about presenting ways of living 
that continue to encompass the characteristics of life 
that are valued but could be enacted and fuelled in very 
different ways. This is as opposed to narratives of change 
that might characterise food, for example, in terms of 
sustenance and fail to incorporate consideration of the 
social importance of food (on the social significance of 
food see Warde, 1997; Smart, 2007).
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As a final point, in imagining future change participants 
also raised questions about who might get left behind as 
particular technologies, skills sets, and so forth, become 
obsolete. 
P: The other thing I was thinking of is - if in an ideal world 
electricity supply is plentiful and running continually, 
what would then happen to the people who have gas or 
oil fitted - they would have to pay to have it removed so it 
is swinging this pendulum from one extreme to the other. 
It comes down to what [refers to other Participant] said, 
I’ve got my back-up plan – where’s yours. If we are in this 
ideal world where we are going to have enough, then what 
is going to happen with what we already have that we 
actually don’t need… (Cumbria) 
 
This represents an important if rarely explicitly discussed 
aspect of transition that necessitates attention in 
processes of system change. In the following section, this 
aspect of discourse around transitions is explicated more 
fully as it arose most strongly in the discussions around 
business, jobs and manufacturing as an element of energy 
system transformation. 
This section has navigated through the ways that our 
participants engaged with and imagined energy system 
futures. Through the discussion key elements of change 
have been highlighted as particularly problematic in 
terms of the possibilities that exist for engendering public 
support; i.e. eating meat, flying for recreation, electrified 
heating systems. There are more general lessons that can 
be discerned from the discussion of these illustrations. 
Crucially, it is important to identify the core characteristics 
of existing system elements that require change to 
understand resistances that may emerge. For example, in 
regard to heating, controllability, speed with which a warm 
temperature can be achieved, cleanliness, and cost, were 
all identified as important characteristics. Moreover, in 
developing new systems, the centrality of “improvement” 
as a necessary precursor to willingness to adopt changes 
was evident (see also Theme 2). The challenges and 
possibilities for imagining futures were also discussed 
within the section, revealing a further set of issues around 
how we can find ways of relating and communicating 
about future visions.
Existing social ideas, perceptions and experiences 
of current elements of the energy system could pose 
significant challenges for achieving energy system 
transitions.
Participant’s sometimes found it difficult to imagine 
change due to their understanding of the complexity 
of energy system transitions, the need to overcome 
energy sector incumbents, and difficulties associated 
with the financing of transitions. 
T8: Workers and Jobs in Energy System 
Transitions
The implications of transitions for jobs have been 
highlighted as an important area of research that has 
been generally neglected within the academic literature 
(Rathzel and Uzzell, 2011). Rathzel and Uzzell (2011) have 
pointed out that energy system transitions will, in one 
way or another, affect workers ‘through the loss of jobs, 
the changing of jobs, and the creation of new jobs’ (2011, 
p. 1215). This implication of energy system transitions 
resonated with our participants and generated a set of 
concerns around jobs and processes of transitioning. At 
the heart of this was recognition of the jobs that existing 
energy systems provide, and of the importance of system 
transformation in bringing new opportunities for jobs and 
skills developments within the UK. 
On one level, discourse about this set of concerns arose 
through prompts relating to the DECC my2050 tool around 
‘manufacturing growth’ and ‘business greenness’. On 
another level, however, issues that pertain to this arose 
organically through the discussions around energy system 
change more generally. With regard to the responses that 
related to the my2050 tool, participants did not engage 
with these aspects of transition in the ways represented 
by the tool. Instead, they made sense of them in their own 
distinct ways, for example, discussing jobs and growth 
of industry more widely, rather than in the specific ways 
depicted in the scenario tool. 
This section explores talk related to jobs, manufacturing 
and business examining in particular, two emergent 
themes: 1) maintaining and developing jobs and skills for 
the UK through transitions; 2) notions of ‘British’ business 
and the relocation of manufacturing to other countries 
(e.g. China). Within this latter point attention will be 
given to the significance of energy system transitions for 
jobs, including discussion of so-called ‘green’ jobs. The 
deliberations around these issues provide an important 
backdrop to the public discourse on energy system 
transitions as they bring into view some of the ways that 
participants engaged with the complexity of change. 
With regard to maintaining jobs for the UK, in the 
following illustrative quote the discussion pertains to 
the phasing out of nuclear power due to concerns about 
safety. The wider point regarding jobs is similar, however, 
for transitions away from other types of energy supply 
technology. 
Deliberating Energy System Transitions in the UK   43 
Transforming the UK Energy System: Public Values, Attitudes and Acceptability 
P1: everyone’s saying that there are jobs [in nuclear 
energy], and these people, it’s their life, oh aye. I just think 
if something happens... In a perfect world I would love to 
have all these wind farms and all this clean air and all 
that, but it’s not going to happen if there’s no jobs in it…
[…]
P2: So I don’t know how many people are employed in 
Sellafield, say it’s two or three hundred… Say a thousand, 
right? So it’s Friday morning, they’re going in and they 
say to the whole staff, “right, we are closing this, it is a 
danger”, what about all these family men and the wives 
and the kids, and what are they going to do? So that’s 
what I mean by catch 22 situation, some people say it’s 
dangerous, but the people that work there, they make 
their living there, and I mean what do you think they’d 
all say on Friday morning if they said, “right, the door’s 
closing today, and that’s you” (Glasgow) 
 
In the first part of this quote, the participant raises 
questions about whether ‘cleaner’ forms of energy 
production like wind farms would produce jobs. This 
concern about the relative implications for jobs across 
different forms of energy production was a prevalent issue 
raised by participants in the workshops. Important here 
was that our participants made real such consequences 
through imaginary positioning and empathy with those 
workers who may lose their jobs in transitions. The latter 
part of this quote pertains more to the question of who 
will lose out or be left behind in transitioning to less 
“dangerous” systems of provisioning. This represented a 
core concern but was also matched by a set of discourses 
around the potentially positive implications of transitions 
for job creation and economic growth. 
P: But [developing tidal energy] that’s all jobs. That’s a 
new source of jobs - we have no jobs to give anybody - it’s 
work... that is our future, isn’t it, so if that is our future 
and it’s going to be clean, safe and create jobs - because 
then you’ll have all your engineers, you’ve got the builders 
and things... (Cumbria)
P: If we get in at the beginning, we could be selling 
the [wind and wave] technology to the rest of Europe 
(Edinburgh) 
 
Also indicated by the above quotes, is the importance  
of place and socio-political histories of place (see  
Theme 6). We found that narratives about the potential 
for job creation through renewable energy development 
varied across the different areas in which we undertook 
the research and were particularly strong in groups 
undertaken in Scotland. 
P: If the wind turbines are for Scotland, let Scotland make 
them. Not Japan or Canada or Timbuktu. (Glasgow) 
Relating to the second theme we have drawn out (i.e. 
concerns about British business), were concerns that 
any potential jobs produced through system transitions 
should bring benefits for the UK. This entailed unease 
with the sense that new system components would be 
imported from elsewhere (e.g. China) and that many 
“new” jobs would be exported to other countries where 
labour is cheaper.
P: It [developing offshore wind] would also produce quite 
a lot of jobs, unless we built them in China and shipped 
them over. (Cardiff) 
 
These discourses around jobs were also pertinent to 
views on the growing or shrinking of manufacturing 
and businesses, beyond energy companies, in processes 
of transition. Though there was concern about climate 
change and the polluting nature of many industries, 
there was a sense that the emissions were being 
created but were simply located in other countries. This 
logic led participants to conclude that in the shifting 
of manufacturing from the UK to other countries the 
principle issues of pollution and climate change were 
not being addressed, while at the same time jobs for 
the UK were being reduced. Additionally, emissions and 
pollution from industry were viewed as more controllable 
if located within the UK. In this regard there was a clear 
set of concerns around the decline of manufacturing 
and industry, matched by an equally strong desire for 
increased levels of business and core manufacturing 
industries within UK borders. In general, there was a 
sense that growing manufacturing within Britain would 
likely improve economic stability and help to revive or 
maintain skills within the UK. 
P: Well, we want more [manufacturing], we have got 
to have more… to expand the economy and create jobs 
(Merthyr). 
 
A further facet to this line of discourse was the notion 
that growing the manufacturing base in the UK would 
increase national revenue and provide a basis for the 
financing of energy system transitions. 
P: And there would be more revenue wouldn’t there… 
There would be more money to put in to do more with 
what you were saying… like solar… (London)  
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This narrative about growth and manufacturing 
appears to conflict with participant’s views on reducing 
consumption and the more transformative kinds of 
change discussed in Theme 2. Such contradictions were 
addressed by participants in the groups through their 
discussions of notions like “paradox” and “complexity” 
(London), and their narratives around the problems of 
achieving “balance” (Cardiff). This represented an area 
where the difficulties of transitioning were most apparent 
– participants across all groups associated growth in 
manufacturing with jobs and economic stability yet, at the 
same time, viewed the current culture of consumerism 
as “wasteful” (Merthyr) and inherently problematic. 
Such issues were connected to questions about whether 
growth in manufacturing was in ‘green’ industry and jobs. 
Participant’s views with regard to this were mixed, in part, 
because of doubts regarding what constituted ‘green’ 
industry. In general, though, there was a sense that if 
improvements in the manufacturing base of Britain could 
generate green jobs that would be preferable to traditional 
industry (e.g. conventional car manufacturing). 
P: Yeah, I mean there’s an opportunity there, isn’t there?  
I mean, electric cars, that whole technology, there’s a world 
waiting isn’t there? (Cumbria) 
 
It is important to highlight, however, that ultimately 
manufacturing and the related jobs were viewed as 
important to develop in the UK regardless of the particular 
industry. This had interesting implications with regard 
to things like CCS, which was viewed more favourably in 
the context of industrial emissions, if it allowed heavy 
industry (e.g. the steel industry) and the associated jobs to 
continue (see also Theme 5). In contrast, CCS evoked much 
more negative discourses when proposed for sequestering 
emissions directly from power stations. We suggest that 
this was principally due to a perception that energy could 
be generated in other ways (prompted by the whole 
system framing of the deliberations), whereas some heavy 
industries do not have clear alternatives. Concerns about 
CCS remained, however, even in this context.
P: Obviously maybe if it was really essential then maybe 
we could carbon capture just for those essential industries 
and make a trade off (London) 
 
Overall, this area of discussion in the workshops 
represented one where the complexity and difficulty of 
transitioning to more sustainable energy systems was 
brought to the fore. These were issues that people were 
strongly engaged with but found difficult to negotiate.  
In particular, problems of measuring emissions in terms 
of national territory arose as a challenging issue through 
these discussions (on territorial versus consumption-
based emissions see Bows and Barrett, 2010). This 
concern, in turn, was tied to a more general set of issues 
perceived to have been generated through processes 
of global economic expansion, i.e. poor treatment of 
workers in other countries in places where standards 
and wages were cheaper. The connections that thought 
about manufacturing and jobs brought into view were 
of central importance in the deliberations about energy 
system change. They engendered a level of reflection 
and engagement with the deep roots of current systems 
of provisioning and with questions of more radical 
transformative change that are not necessarily visible  
in discussion focused purely on technological shifts. 
This theme has explored our participants’ thoughts and 
concerns related to the impacts of transitions on jobs and 
manufacturing, and vice-versa. Two broad aspects have 
formed the focus for discussion. First, we detail concerns 
that certain skills and industries may be left behind and 
become obsolete leading to job losses. In the second 
aspect, tensions between ‘green’ opportunities and the 
preference for increased manufacturing beyond green 
industries formed the focus. Overall, we have navigated 
through our participant’s dilemma of wanting change  
(see Theme 2), while, at the same time, having deep 
concerns about economic growth and threats to 
livelihoods that transition will pose for some. 
There are key concerns about the relative 
implications for jobs raising questions about who 
will ‘lose out’ or be ‘left behind’ in transitions.
There was a sense that growing manufacturing 
within Britain would be likely to improve economic 
stability and help to revive or maintain skills within 
the UK. Whilst there was some level of uncertainty 
over what constitutes green jobs, if improvements 
in the manufacturing base of Britain could generate 
such jobs this was preferable.
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T9: Governance, Policies and Strategy in  
Public View
There is a wide ranging academic literature that 
addresses questions of governance in the context of 
energy systems transitions and sustainability more 
generally (e.g. see Jordon, 2008; 2009; Geels, Hekkert 
and Jacobsson, 2008; Shove and Walker, 2007; Smith et 
al. 2005). This literature has explored issues around the 
extent to which technological and economic systems will 
require governance in order to move in more sustainable 
directions. While analyses have shown how transitions 
tend to emerge in an organic and undirected manner, 
these works also show how governments and other 
governing institutions have a hand in shaping, creating 
and delivering historical transformations (e.g. see Jones, 
2011; Geels, 2006). 
Much of the focus in existing work on transitions and 
governance has been on industry and governments. 
There are, then, an important set of questions remaining 
about how wider public(s) view governance arrangements 
and relate to processes of governing for energy system 
transitions. This is an issue that has been touched upon 
throughout this report (e.g. see Themes 2, 5 and 7), but 
in this section we bring together analysis focused more 
tightly on perceptions of governance. This includes 
examination of publics’ expectations with regard to 
governance, their views on the place of policy, statutes 
and guidance, and their perspectives on particular policies 
already in existence as well as ideas that could underpin 
new and emerging policy.
The perceived role of government is multi-faceted 
and not unproblematic yet, at the core, publics locate 
responsibility for delivering transitions with government, 
including local, central and wider governing institutions. 
It is not necessarily the case that publics think that the 
government should lead the way, rather that they must, 
as there are no alternative groups that hold enough power 
(e.g. industry) who can be trusted to do so in their stead. 
P1: I’d trust the government more in that it’s not a 
business, so that they’re…
P2: But they keep changing their mind. (London)  
 
Perceptions of where power is located were central to 
discourse about governance and who should govern 
energy systems transformations. In this regard, both 
national governments and industry were viewed as 
holding significant levels of power, to the extent that 
participants could not imagine how transitions could 
occur without these system actors taking the lead. 
P: The transitions can be individually led, by individuals 
making those changes but there has to be an overall 
umbrella of information and this is the plan, the tapering 
off point, and it has to be a high level where decisions are 
made to do these things. (Cumbria).
Government, though not trusted to a large degree, were 
trusted more than industry and were also perceived as 
more accountable to public(s) (see also Theme 3). This is 
particularly the case for energy system transitions as they 
encompass concerns about sustainability, climate change 
and so forth. These issues were perceived as things that 
would not be addressed through profit motivated actions 
and therefore were unlikely to be delivered by industry 
and business. This was despite energy businesses being 
viewed as both powerful and culpable for energy system 
transitions. This related closely to a perception that 
incumbent energy industries work to hold back or limit 
transitions acting as gatekeepers to prevent change, rather 
than driving transitions forward. 
P: I think they’ve [‘things’ that are better for the 
environment] been ready for a long time and they’re in the 
background and the only thing stopping them (personally 
I think, and I might be totally wrong) is the people who 
own the oil, the people with the money, and the power in 
the whole world, who are selling the such and such, so 
many dollars for a barrel of oil and all that. (Edinburgh) 
 
Despite the distinctions that were made between industry 
and government, participants recognised and expressed 
concern about the connections between them. For some, 
whilst business and industry were seen as profiteering 
entities, their motivations and agendas were well 
understood. Conversely, the agendas of governments  
were often deemed opaque, creating concern about 
“ulterior motives” (London). Despite this, in discussions  
of responsibility for change, it was government that  
our participants repeatedly returned to as ultimately 
holding responsibility for supporting, engendering, and 
enacting change.
That is not to say that our participants found the role 
of government unproblematic. Indeed, a set of concerns 
emerged about current governance structures and their 
suitability for addressing sustainability and energy issues. 
For example, our participants argued that the 5 year 
terms of office meant governments were not willing or 
able to take a longer-term view. Such short-termism in 
the electoral cycle was suggested as contributing to the 
creation of a culture whereby politicians were unwilling  
to take the risks necessary for delivering change or take  
a lead in advocating approaches to transition. 
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P: And going back to the point [refers to other participant] 
made where you’ve got that political swinging of the 
pendulum. It is actually knowing well, what else do you 
want us to do – you keep telling us this but what do you 
want us to do, come on give us some ideas and let’s do 
something. (Cumbria). 
 
In previous themes (e.g. see Themes 2, 3 and 6) we have 
discussed the importance of institutional ‘body language’ 
(Wynne 1996) and the issues that arise when formal 
political rhetoric is not perceived to match with actions 
and other forms of communication. In the context of 
this theme, a lack of legislation and regulatory action 
was viewed by participants as indicative of a lack of real 
commitment within government to address energy related 
issues, like climate change. 
P: Talking about climate change is fine but at the same 
time the government is not doing enough to think about 
the wastage, the resources and the way we do things. 
(London). 
 
Indeed, some participants were keen to see government 
“put up, instead of talking about it all the time” 
(Edinburgh). This type of discourse was also indicative 
of the perceived need for synergistic policy goals that 
connect in coherent ways across all sectors of policy 
making and government departments. Our participants, 
then, saw disconnects between different policy arenas, 
leading to the belief that an overarching strategy for 
policy may be needed to facilitate change. Many aspects 
of transitions throughout all of the discussions were 
expressed as needing action from government, including 
the development of better public transport (in terms of 
being more efficient, cost effective, flexible and higher 
quality), creation of government (and not industry) led 
energy efficiency programmes (e.g. installing insulation for 
all irrespective of financial capabilities), and laws to help 
prevent waste (e.g. packaging and junk mail) from being 
created. Ultimately, participants argued that if government 
is convinced by the evidence underpinning  
its policy aims and strategies, then they should reinforce 
this belief through legislation. 
P: I feel if it is effective [referring to insulation] then they 
should put it into law. (London) 
 
Participants in the groups often defaulted to a position that 
policy and regulation could and should be used to stimulate 
wider change. At times, force was seen as a means for kick-
starting change until the imperatives or ideals held within 
formal rules and regulations (i.e. policies and statutes) are 
codified into practices, norms and behaviours. A specific 
example given as a piece of legislation that some of our 
participants have experienced, which has been perceived 
as successfully prompting a change in norms is the 5p 
single use carrier bag charge that the Welsh Government 
brought into effect from 1st October 2011 (also Poortinga, 
Whitmarsh and Suffolk, 2012).
P1: …recently with the carrier bags in supermarkets, a lot 
of them charge you. When it first came in everyone would 
moan about paying 5p for a bag, but if you go into Asda 
now, you see how many people bring their own bags. 
People have got used to it because they don’t want to pay 
for it. They think actually it is not that bad or that much 
of a difference that was just persuading people to do it.
P2: Interestingly now, people getting on that it is cool to 
be green. It is cool to be seen carrying a reusable bag and 
seen to be doing your bit.
P3: The cashier will say to you “how many bags of your 
own did you bring today?” and straight away if you 
haven’t that day you start to worry. (Cardiff). 
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London transport policy, specifically related to the Oyster 
Smartcard (a plastic card that can be used to pay for bus, 
tube, tram and overground rail services in London), was 
also given as an example of a change that has successfully 
promoted change in transport practices. 
P1: Oyster card is, you know you wouldn’t believe 
something as simple as that would make life that much 
better, I never realised how wonderful it was. But I see it 
a bit in Wales and it is fragmented and doesn’t seem to 
make much sense (London). 
 
The simplicity of the Oyster card system was identified by 
our participants as a change which sent a clear signal that 
efforts were being made to improve the usability of public 
transport. By contrast, the London congestion charge was 
given by some as an example of how ‘blanket’ policies 
were in danger of allowing those with greater financial 
means to avoid making necessary changes. 
P: I think the congestion charge in London is great but 
I do think then the rich people just swan about, but 
environmentally it is done for the right reasons, but all of 
a sudden outside the congestion charge becomes really, 
really congested. (Cardiff). 
 
Indeed, there was a general sense that relying on 
financial charges, or sanctions, as the means to engender 
change could be problematic precisely because money 
has a disproportionate value to those that are more or 
less affluent. Again, sustained regulatory and statutory 
enforcement (i.e. the ‘stick’) was advocated as an 
important means for ensuring change, which could be 
coupled with incentives and rewards (i.e. a ‘carrot’), rather 
than sanctions. 
Whilst there was support for legislation to facilitate and 
enforce change, our participants also wanted policies and 
legislation to have a certain amount of flexibility to ensure 
they are responsive to different biographical contexts (also 
Theme 6). In particular, participants were concerned that 
policies should not negatively affect vulnerable groups. 
One illustration of this concern manifested in discussion 
about a hypothetical policy created and discussed by 
a group in Edinburgh, wherein they envisioned home 
central heating thermostats that would not go above a 
certain level.
P: …if there is a law, or we have created heaters which 
don’t go above 20 or 30 then it is so cold, what happens to 
the aged, those that are disabled or something like that? 
(Edinburgh)
When discussing the now defunct Home Information 
Packs (HIPs), our participants revealed two important 
policy characteristics that can engender public support, 
or conversely generate public scepticism, with regard to 
legislation. First, the motivations, aims and objectives for a 
policy should be abundantly clear to publics. Second,  
the government must be committed to a policy. 
P1: And also it’s interesting that the home packs for when 
you’re selling with all the energy efficiency schemes were 
dropped very quickly. Unfortunately I had to do mine just 
before it got dropped, and I looked at it as being a bit of lip 
service anyway. I don’t see it as, it’s a political thing.
P2: It’s a stealth tax, they are just trying to make money 
out of it in any way they possibly can.
P3: There was very little thought because the people who 
were involved in selling them, kind of bypassed it,  
it wasn’t taken seriously. (London) 
 
The HIP and, in particular, the Energy Performance 
Certification (the latter of which is still a statutory 
requirement) were in and of themselves seen to engender 
engagement with energy efficiency. However, this success 
was compromised when the benefits to individuals were 
obfuscated and entangled with a motivation believed to 
be more to do with profit (“stealth tax”) than ensuring 
an energy efficient home. This perception was further 
amplified when HIPs as a statutory mechanism were 
abandoned, leading to the perception that policy can be 
quite fickle. 
This perceived fickleness becomes quite critical when 
considering models for enacting change that rely on 
public engagement and a more sustained agreement; 
for example, the Green Deal. Whilst there was general 
enthusiasm in principle for schemes like the Green Deal, 
this was coupled with substantial reservations about 
how such schemes could be implemented. This included 
concern about the role of energy utilities (see Theme 3). 
More congruent to the current theme is the discourse 
which revealed reservations publics had about, for 
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example, “the small print” (Merthyr), the interest rates of 
the “loan”, and about what happens “after you’ve paid it 
off… do they continue to service it for you?” (Edinburgh).
Discussions about government and the mechanisms of 
governance (e.g. policies, regulations and laws) were also 
bound up with notions and concerns about the level of 
intrusion and power that government should be afforded 
over our lives (also see Theme 2). There appears to be a 
tension between general support for strong governmental 
steers and regulation, and concerns over the power that 
governments are afforded.
P: I don’t like to give governments too much power. Then 
they get overly enamoured with themselves. (Glasgow). 
 
This theme has brought together discourse relating to 
public perceptions of governance, the role of government, 
and policies in energy system change. Whilst it has 
covered discussions about a broad array of past and 
present policy instruments (e.g. HIPs, Green Deal), the 
specific examples cited should be read as exemplars of 
more general views on policy and regulatory instruments. 
Clearly there remain significant concerns over power, 
motivations underpinning government policies, means 
and impacts of policy implementation, and sustaining 
policy trajectories. Despite these concerns, it was clear 
that publics felt the role of both government and formal 
processes of regulation, particularly legislation, are integral 
to engendering and enacting low carbon transitions.
Government, though not trusted to a large degree, 
were trusted more than industry and were also 
perceived as more accountable to public(s).
A lack of legislation and regulatory action was 
viewed by participants as indicative of there being 
no real commitment within government to address 
energy related issues. 
There was also a desire for synergistic policy goals 
that connect in coherent ways across all sectors of 
policy making.
T10: System Links: Making Connections? 
Previous research has recognised that the technological 
and social dimensions of energy systems are strongly 
intertwined and thus difficult to consider separately 
(e.g. Poumadère et al., 2011; Geels, Hekkert and 
Jacobsson, 2008; Shove, 2003). Added to this has 
been an increasing concern with notions of whole 
energy systems and the importance of thinking about 
transitions as an interconnected set of changes across 
different technologies, infrastructures, and resources 
(e.g. EPSRC, 2013). Though whole systems analysis is 
increasingly undertaken in energy transitions modelling, 
public perceptions research has in the main examined 
perspectives on energy technologies one system 
component at a time (e.g. public perceptions of CCS or 
wind energy, or energy efficiency). The distinctiveness of 
this research project is the importance placed on keeping 
the whole system in view and exploring how perspectives 
are formulated when links and interconnections between 
different energy system elements are made explicit. 
Throughout the workshops, the scenario building tool (see 
Methods) was utilised to keep the whole system in view 
and to direct participants to consider the implications 
of decisions about one aspect of change for other 
dimensions (e.g. the implications of not reducing high 
demand for meeting carbon targets). Additionally, the 
research was designed in such a way so as to draw out 
connections that were not necessarily visible from the use 
of the scenario tool alone. For example, the connections 
between demand management, storage, and high levels of 
renewable energy in future systems. 
Crucially, participants were actively encouraged to think 
through the potential impacts of different elements of 
system change for both their own lives and other aspects 
of the energy system. In essence, participants either 
volunteered or were prompted to consider interactions 
across the whole system, including social and technical 
dimensions. In this last analytic theme, we wish to 
explore some of the linkages that were or were not made 
by our participants. We discuss the forms of connection 
that members of the public made themselves, their 
responses to inter-linkages that were highlighted by 
facilitators, and the ways that discussion of trade-offs 
manifested in our participants’ discourse. 
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A key way in which participants in the groups made 
connections was through discussion about the 
connectivity between their selves and others - this 
included other people, but also distant places and other 
times (pasts and futures). Fundamentally, our participants 
recognised not only the linkages within the UK’s energy 
system but also – as discussions around energy security 
illustrate – how we are part of a global energy system. 
In this regard, they reflected on how the impacts of 
our (national, group and individual) choices are often 
felt at global spatial scales and across different times. 
One element of this kind of connection arose through 
discussion of manufacturing (see also Theme 8) wherein 
the links between environmental and social justice, 
manufacturing, costs of resources, and shifting patterns  
of production, were expounded. 
P: We were talking earlier about being self sufficient, 
but if the steel for instance, if it actually works out 
cheaper to buy it from somewhere else, then what is the 
benefit for us not doing that, it is such a global problem. 
It is very difficult to be that self sufficient, and as it’s 
a business - the money side is always going to come 
into it. Whether we have a duty of care to the people 
who are manufacturing for us, obviously we all know 
the conditions in third world countries and the health 
and safety issues, the poverty lines and things we seem 
fairly happy to turn a blind eye to that, even though we 
are aware of it, like we can’t do anything about it. Is 
the alternative to keep it in house but have much more 
expensive production. It is a very complex issue, like a big 
cobweb really you pull a little thread here and it sends 
off waves all over there. It is all so inter-connected that 
there’s no one thing to pinpoint - whatever you say there 
[participant holds out his right arm], there is a balance 
over here [participant holds out his left arm]. (London) 
 
In some senses, such recognition of global spatial 
links also served to highlight perceived inadequacies 
in current international and national government 
policies. For example, our groups were alert to the 
ambiguity surrounding carbon dioxide emissions 
related to manufacturing, imports and exports. Some 
understood that our emissions would be much higher 
if the manufacturing emissions of the goods we import 
were to be included in the UK carbon budget. They also 
differentiated between emissions at the point of energy 
production and embedded carbon dioxide in objects. 
P1: We create waste and it has to be got rid of and you 
just can’t keep burying it so you have to do something 
with it. If it [Anaerobic Digestion] is a way of creating a 
form of energy, it should be something to look at because 
how long can you keep burying things or dropping it 
into the sea or sending it into space? You can’t just keep 
chucking trillions of tons of waste.
P2: Don’t we have to take it one stage further back and 
see why we are making all this stuff in the first place? Do 
we need to have a new washing machine because there’s 
a new one out? Even if only one person buys one and the 
others go down the chain it’s still creating a waste one at 
the bottom of the chain, so it’s the consumer society that 
creates the waste. Just think of junk mail – you opt out 
but it’s relentless, it still comes through. You put it in the 
recycling and you feel good about recycling it but it is still 
waste as it was a resource to start with – it’s still wasted. 
(Cumbria) 
 
A further important way in which members of the public 
in our groups made connections related to changes in 
the way we use energy (e.g. electrification) and means 
of producing power. At times, this manifested through 
discussion that highlighted issues with making changes to 
demand side technologies without corresponding changes 
to the means of supplying energy. 
P: I take the bus in London, I have a little car but I keep 
that where my mum lives in North Wales, and I love the 
idea of electric cars, but you do essentially plug them in 
and that electricity is probably coming from a coal fired 
thing. (London) 
In the previous quote, the suggestion is that a ‘good’ 
change in energy demand technology (e.g. a move from a 
petrol vehicle to an electric one) is negatively affected by 
the means of supply being ‘bad’. Conversely, at other times 
participants implied that a ‘good’ source of power could 
be negated by a ‘bad’ form of usage (where increased 
demand was seen as ‘bad’). These forms of discourse 
around energy demand and supply led in some cases to 
discussion of the need for, and importance of, balance in 
delivering successful energy system transitions. 
The distinctiveness of this 
research project is the 
importance placed on keeping 
the whole system in view and 
exploring how perspectives 
are formulated when links 
and interconnections between 
different energy system 
elements are made explicit.
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P: So if we are manufacturing more here, which means 
we are using more energy, but then surely we’re doing 
the solar panels, the wind turbines and it balances out… 
(Glasgow) 
 
Though participants often made connections between 
energy demand and supply, it was rare that they would 
spontaneously connect forms of supply with the need 
for increased energy demand management. As we have 
reported in earlier sections of this report, our participants 
were often extremely keen to pursue renewables forms 
of energy production. There remained a need, however, 
for facilitators to pose the idea that there will likely be a 
need for (some forms of) renewable energy to be coupled 
with changes on the demand-side in the form of demand 
management or levelling. Though participants did not 
raise this themselves suggesting that it is not currently 
part of the public conception of renewable energy, 
when prompted by facilitators the notion of demand 
management did not lead to decreases in support for 
renewable energy. Instead, participants engaged with 
proposals for demand management in considered ways, 
highlighting approaches that offer a greater role for 
public(s) as preferable to externally controlled demand 
management (see Theme 4). A further way in which some 
of our participants engaged with demand management 
was to question whether there were possibilities for 
technological development that could enable balancing  
of demand, such as through the advancement of batteries 
or other forms of storage. 
P: I think there must be a way round that, you know 
actually store it [electricity produced from wind power] in 
the house, the power that you get, surely? So you could 
use it at a time convenient. Cos you’re not always in the 
house to do the washing in the wind to use it at a time 
which is convenient. (Glasgow) 
Overall, then, the public(s) in our groups did not reject 
renewable energies in light of the need to balance 
demand. It is possible that demand management 
in this context was seen as enabling (i.e. facilitating 
a preferred form of supply), rather than prohibitive 
(i.e. in restricting energy use). This ‘enabling’ frame 
that appeared to underpin engagement with demand 
management suggests openness to compromise in public 
thinking about energy system change. This is particularly 
interesting when we consider some existing assumptions 
that circulate regarding expectations for public(s) to be 
resistant to change that can be characterised as creating 
‘inconvenience’. Whilst in this report we have, in some 
detail, explored some of the perceived constraints on 
change (social, structural, technical and political), we 
have also, throughout this theme and others, espoused 
numerous examples where public unacceptability of 
“inconvenient” change does not necessarily occur. For 
instance, in addition to the example outlined above, 
in Theme 3 we showed how projected increases in 
household bills due to the capital investment needed 
for renewable energy, did not necessarily lead our 
participants to reduce their support of renewables. 
A further way in which our participants made links across 
the energy system was in terms of the different forms of 
connecting and network infrastructures. There was an 
understanding that a shift in service provision (e.g. a move 
from gas central heating to electric) would have resultant 
impacts not only on forms of supply, but also on the 
infrastructure that connects supply to demand.
P: A whole electrical system for heating, would that be 
pylons? …You hear talk about this electrical system 
that has the frequency waves that can cause ill health… 
(Cumbria) 
 
In this case, the links made with regard to the potential 
requirements for new network infrastructure generate 
concern about the potential health risks of pylons. As 
previous themes have shown, other key concerns that 
emerge out of the links made between the provision  
of new forms of supply and use, and infrastructure 
changes, were related to the difficulty of providing the 
requisite infrastructure needed to support services  
(e.g. EV charging points). 
Deliberating Energy System Transitions in the UK   51 
Transforming the UK Energy System: Public Values, Attitudes and Acceptability 
Beyond the connections that were reflected upon 
across energy supply, energy usage and connecting 
infrastructure, our participants made linkages between 
the technical, social and political dimensions of energy 
systems. In essence, this represented recognition of the 
ways that possibilities for change were constrained or 
facilitated not only through what is technically feasible, 
but also – and perhaps more importantly – through social 
and political factors (e.g. public acceptability or political 
support). Indeed, our participants suggested that, at times, 
whether energy system changes were enacted or not 
would be overwhelmingly dependent on political will and 
on decisions taken by others at different scales.
P: See that choice though [between fossil fuel or low 
carbon forms of supply] is that not kinda out of our 
hands mainly, ‘cause on the other things it was personal 
to our homes, whereas that one it depends on what the 
government choose… (Edinburgh) 
 
Points of connection were also evident across different 
issues, with such links forming points of comparison  
that enabled our participant’s to formulate and “anchor” 
their views. 
P: One of the problems is I think you look at the news 
any day of this week and there are areas of Africa which 
are having the worst droughts in 60 years so there is 
an example of a topic relating to this, then you have the 
gunman going on and all this doom and gloom and if it 
was on your doorstep then it would be horrific and it is 
horrific, but you see so much of it, it’s not that you become 
immune to it, it is just you hear it and a few day later it is 
gone so until it really impacts you right on your doorstep 
your issues are more to do with you and what is going on 
under your roof and on your doorstep. (Cardiff) 
 
In this illustrative quote the participant explicates their 
feelings about energy system change and the global 
issues that were under consideration in the workshops 
(e.g. climate change), by relating them to their thoughts 
about global issues more widely. In this case, they 
use this mode of connecting up to make sense of a 
disjuncture they perceived between their everyday life 
and local environment, and their sense of the wider 
issues scrutinised in the group discussions. The temporal 
rhythms associated with media and news coverage are 
in this instance highlighted as potentially problematic 
for engendering engagement with long term social and 
environmental issues (see Adam, 1998). 
Additionally, this extract is indicative of issues associated 
with the contrasting temporalities of everyday life, 
and those of global environmental problems. The 
differing temporalities of daily rhythms and longer-term 
environmental change can serve to create a disjuncture 
between practices that are seen as involving immediate 
responses and those that are deemed necessary to meet 
moral responsibilities for more distant futures (see Shirani 
et al., 2013). This observation brings a set of questions 
around how to engage people with longer term concerns, 
like those of energy system transformation, in ways 
that connect with their everyday lives. In this regard, 
communicating about more concrete forms of change  
for which support exists to allow their ready enactment 
may be core to processes of public engagement with 
system change. 
The final aspect to be discussed with regard to system 
links is that of trade-offs. A key way in which energy 
system change has been discussed within expert 
discourse is in terms of trade-offs between different 
aspects of system change (e.g. cost versus environmental 
sustainability). The workshops were designed to facilitate 
public engagement with such possible trade-offs and 
throughout the report these issues have explored. For 
example, in Theme 5 we explored how when biofuels 
are contrasted with fossil fuels, concerns about biofuels 
are traded off against greater concerns about fossil fuels. 
In this regard connections were made between different 
aspects of system change in order to contextualise 
viewpoints. That is to say, views on different aspects 
of energy systems were formed in relation to other 
components of system change. This represents, then, a 
further key way in which system linkages were made, 
but also used, within public discourse – i.e. through 
juxtaposing and comparing different elements of the 
energy system. 
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In this section we have discussed the multiple ways that 
our publics made connections across different aspects of 
energy system change, including inter-linkages between 
supply and demand, and the social, political and technical 
aspects of transition. We have also shown that when 
publics were less able to make connections (e.g. between 
renewable energy and demand management), prompting 
discussion of such linkages produced discussion that 
offered explanatory power for understanding public 
responses – i.e. demand management was principally 
treated by participants as something that could enable 
development of renewable forms of energy production. 
The links our participants made were not limited to 
how decisions over supply may impact on demand-side 
services (e.g. electrification on heat and transport). Our 
participants were often alert to the different ways their 
choices may potentially, positively or negatively, impact 
themselves and wider (present and future) society. This 
included both direct impacts of having a certain supply-
side technology (such as those associated with having new 
infrastructures sited nearby), and more indirect impacts 
(for example with regard to energy costs). Other forms 
of interconnection, such as across different issues (for 
example global poverty), across space, and through time, 
were also frequently made by participants. Additionally, 
contrasting and comparing different elements of system 
change represented a further way in which system links 
emerged as important within the research. 
The discussion in this section bears more directly on the 
core benefits of using a whole system lens – that is, the 
ability to bring into view the interconnections between 
different aspects of energy system change. The whole system 
lens also facilitated a more open frame for discussion and 
allowed participants opportunities to situate UK energy 
system transitions within the wider global socio-political and 
economic context. Investigating public perceptions using a 
whole system lens does, however, also present distinct issues 
and challenges. For example, some of our participants after 
a full-day deliberating the whole system were in danger of 
feeling overwhelmed.
P1: I’m sorry I feel so depressed! 
M: Oh, sorry [laughter from group]
P2: That’s it we’re heading home now
P3: That’s it, that’s the end of us. Can I have some Vodka? 
(Merthyr) 
 
Ultimately we would suggest that this section and the 
research overall serves to exemplify the opportunities 
and need for interrogating system interconnections. 
Centrally, it highlights the potential for such research 
approaches to generate evidence that can help underpin 
‘more coordinated and effective governance’ (Poumadère 
et al., 2011, p. 714) of complex issues related to energy 
system change.
Our participants recognised not only the linkages 
within the UK’s energy system but also how we are 
part of a global energy system.
At times participants suggested that a ‘good’ change 
in energy demand technology (e.g. a move from 
a petrol vehicle to an electric one) is negatively 
affected by the means of supply being ‘bad’. 
Conversely, at other times participants implied that 
a ‘good’ source of power could be negated by a ‘bad’ 
form of usage (where increased demand was seen 
as ‘bad’).
Communicating about more 
concrete forms of change for 
which support exists to allow 
their ready enactment may 
be core to processes of public 
engagement with system change.
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4
Concluding 
discussion 
54  
“Wouldn’t it be nice if it was that easy, sliding  
something on the computer” (Merthyr) 
 
The complexity and difficulties of achieving change 
captured in the quote above represented a key recurring 
theme throughout the deliberative processes. This 
was matched, however, by an equally strong sense of 
interest in engaging with questions of change and the 
development of solutions to the major contemporary 
problems under discussion. Indeed, a focus on energy 
system transitions as the starting point for the workshops 
was viewed by participants as a positive opening for 
debate and engagement. This is reflective of one of the key 
and arguably most important findings to emerge from this 
work – that participants in the deliberative engagement 
processes were positive about notions of energy system 
change in a general sense, and indeed, that they expected 
change if it was necessary to avert impacts associated 
with issues of energy insecurity, un-affordability, and 
climate change. 
Indeed, it was very clear from the workshops that 
the manifestation of impacts associated with all of 
these issues was highly unacceptable (e.g. floods 
and extreme weather events associated with climate 
change, unaffordable energy, and “black outs”). In line 
with existing evidence, energy becoming unaffordable 
represented perhaps the most evocative issue for many 
participants, particularly in the current economic context. 
From this research we argue, however, that it is crucial 
to recognise how concern about cost and affordability of 
energy is bound up with a wider set of issues relating to, 
for example, the undesirable nature of existing market 
arrangements, particular perceptions of energy (i.e. as 
a basic need not simply another consumer product/
service per se), and current governance arrangements 
(e.g. ineffectual market regulation). Overall, there was a 
widespread perception that fair, transparent pricing is not 
being delivered through the current liberalised system and 
that changes to address affordability should be centred  
on ensuring these characteristics within energy pricing. 
We began this report by outlining the objectives we aim  
to fulfil through doing this phase of research. Whilst  
many of our findings cut across several or all of the 
objectives (for example those we outline above), the  
rest of this chapter will speak more specifically to each  
of our stated objectives.
Objective 1
To highlight key points of agreement and 
contestation regarding tradeoffs including the 
conditions of acceptance relating to different energy 
systems scenarios. 
On the surface trade-offs appear to be representative of the 
ways publics and stakeholders decide between different 
options, such as those “apparent” within energy system 
change. Though our data in many cases speaks to questions 
of ‘trade-offs’ (e.g. see Theme 5 – the discussion about 
biofuels and oil), it also reveals core problems in terms 
of characterising transitions in this way. Centrally, such 
problems relate to the fact that many aspects of change, 
which might be characterised as being a trade-off, are not 
in actuality likely to manifest in this way. That is to say, 
questions of system change are rarely either/or questions 
and simplifying them in this way may obscure more than 
it enlightens. For example, for some bio-energy is not 
acceptable but it is regarded as better than oil; for this 
reason the negative things associated with bio-fuels may 
be traded off and accepted if it facilitates transition from oil 
based transport systems. The reality is, however, that future 
systems are likely to continue to use oil and bio-energy not 
one or the other, meaning this is not really a trade-off. The 
fact that our participants recognised that framing options 
and choices as trade-offs was in a sense problematic, is a 
key analytical insight that speaks to the ability of publics to 
fully engage in the deliberation of complex energy issues 
when they are given the opportunity.
The fact that our participants 
recognised that framing options 
and choices as trade-offs was 
in a sense problematic, is a key 
analytical insight that speaks 
to the ability of publics to fully 
engage in the deliberation of 
complex energy issues when 
they are given the opportunity.
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Whilst the notion of trade-offs between different 
components of energy system change unravelled 
somewhat with careful analysis of the data, this did 
not diminish the importance of juxtaposing system 
components to compare and contrast, and to facilitate  
the exposition of the acceptability of transitions. Indeed, 
we maintain that the whole systems framing utilised  
in this research had a significant impact on the ways  
that participants engaged with questions of energy  
system change. 
This was particularly evident in relation to aspects 
like carbon capture and storage where the rational for 
developing it only seemed to be acceptable in the event 
there was no other transitional option. This manifested as 
a “why do that when there are other options?” response. 
This was also reflected in the more favourable responses 
to CCS for particular forms of emissions; i.e. from 
industrial processes where there was a perception that 
other options were not available. 
Objective 2
To reveal the values which underpin people’s 
decisions and attitudes towards whole energy 
system change scenarios.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Whilst trade-offs had less explanatory power than we had 
anticipated for understanding public attitudes, exploring 
the values that underpin people’s attitudes has been a 
much more successful strategy. For example, as Theme 
3 discussed, affordability of energy is often positioned 
by the media as a trade-off with certain forms of energy 
system development, the assumption being that publics 
will prefer a low-cost pathway and reject a high-cost 
pathway to energy system change. Accordingly, it is often 
anticipated that publics will reject high-cost pathways 
due to concerns about personal energy security which 
is intimately connected with issues around affordability. 
If we follow this logic, support for a system premised on 
large amounts of renewable energy may be diminished 
due to concerns about the large amount of capital 
investment needed for this sort of system to be realised 
and the potential for such investment to cause consumer 
bills to increase. Yet our analysis shows that this is not 
necessarily the case. Concerns regarding affordability and 
financing of transitions relate more to issues associated 
with the perceived actions of energy companies and their 
profit-making orientation. 
Within the context of such concerns, our participants 
expressed the desirability of a shift to an energy system 
imbued with values including ‘fairness’ (in terms of the 
distribution of cost and responsibility for paying for 
transitions), ‘trustworthiness’ (of energy utilities and 
other stakeholders responsible for setting, for example, 
prices or “green” taxes) and ’transparency’ (in for example, 
how profits from consumers are used and the reasons 
underpinning the price of energy). The implication of 
these and other findings here is that the bigger barrier 
is not cost per se but public trust in the actors who 
have key roles in using resources to deliver transitions. 
Considerable work is therefore needed to develop trust 
in energy system companies, operators and regulators 
before we could really expect to see manifestation of 
acceptability regarding bill increases for particular forms 
of transition in “real world” contexts.  
Beyond financial aspects, a core finding of the 
research with regard to transitions relates to the idea 
of “improvement” as a necessary underpinning for 
engendering support for different routes to change. 
Our research gives insight into the values characteristic 
of systems of provisioning that are regarded as 
important and favourable across both demand and 
supply dimensions (e.g. clean, natural, controllable, and 
efficient). Understanding these characteristics and how 
to develop and envision transitions that will be viewed 
as “improvement” is likely to be of utmost importance 
in the realisation of system transformations. The notion 
of “improvement” can be seen as contrasting with “non-
transitions” (i.e. Theme 5) – approaches viewed as short 
term and postponing rather than solving problems. By 
their very nature, approaches viewed as having non-
transitional qualities are not commensurate with ideas 
of improvement – rather than representing improved 
systems of provisioning they appear only to ‘cover up’, 
‘fudge’ or ‘suspend’ problems. 
Theme 2 revealed that our participants desired a shift 
to a more sustainable energy system, consisting of a 
supply-side predominantly comprising of renewable 
forms of energy and a society that consumes less. 
Public support for renewable energy, of course, has been 
demonstrated over many years through multiple studies 
(e.g. McGowan and Sauter, 2005) but is often contrasted 
with local contestation – a topic that has also been the 
focus of much previous research (e.g. Bell et al., 2005; 
Devine-Wright, 2011). Additional interesting findings 
from this research relate to the way that information 
regarding the capacity of renewable forms of energy 
supply for providing electricity was received, i.e. showing 
that renewable technology could meet a large proportion 
Our research gives insight into 
the values characteristic of 
systems of provisioning that are 
regarded as favourable across 
both demand and supply.
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of electricity demand further increased the propensity 
toward positive responses. More importantly, associated 
issues such as cost and demand-management did not 
decrease support. Centrally, participants placed value on 
the perceived qualities of renewable energy systems; e.g. 
clean, natural, infinite. These qualities (and others) are 
the things that publics value when it comes to renewable 
energy and they underlay positive attitudes toward such 
forms of power generation. 
Throughout this report the concept of social contracts as a 
way of conceptualising relationships between government, 
markets and public(s) has been applied as a useful way to 
think about transitional processes. We argue that social 
contracts can and do change over time through processes 
of protest, contestation and negotiation, and formulating 
new social contracts is likely to be a necessary precursor 
to the enactment of energy system transformations. Here 
we have provided an indication of some of the core values 
which underlay people’s views on energy system change 
e.g. fairness, cleanness. We suggest that acting in ways 
congruent with these values may offer a basis for the 
development of a new social contract. Central to this will 
be the need to pay attention to existing social contracts 
and the extent to which proposed socio-technological 
changes interfere with them. In these cases there is a need 
to think about change in terms of reciprocity and consider 
how calls placed upon publics to accept changes are being 
met with correspondent obligations for government and 
companies. Crucially, the role of companies in meeting 
aspects of provisioning that would have typically been 
part of government’s role, means there are imperatives 
to clarify the responsibilities and rights of businesses in 
processes of reformulating social contracts. 
Objective 3
To develop insight into public perspectives on 
everyday lifestyle changes implicated in different 
energy system scenarios, both in terms of demand 
side and supply side changes.
Numerous sections of this report have highlighted how 
our participants envision lifestyles to be impacted by 
changes to the energy system. An important finding 
from this research is even those impacts that could 
be characterised as inconvenient or negative were not 
necessarily rejected. As we have previously discussed, our 
participants recognised the need for change and this was 
combined with pragmatism about why and how change 
could be achieved. Yet this is not to say all change was 
embraced wholeheartedly. For instance, in discussions 
about supply-side technologies our participants wanted a 
shift away from an energy system reliant on fossil fuels. 
Yet in discussions about key energy services (e.g. heating 
and transport) it emerged that some of the most prized 
and cherished demand-side technologies (e.g. gas central 
heating, petrol cars) are reliant on the fossil fuels our 
participants sought to move away from. This, of course, 
is only one example of the way discussions embedded 
in everyday life seemingly contradicted more abstract 
level discussions divorced from personal experience. 
Yet such “contradictions” are highly revealing and do 
provide a great deal of insight into what is important to 
our participants and how change can be achieved. For 
instance, continuing the example of central heating, 
such discussions revealed the importance of certain 
characteristics of heat (e.g. high intensity and instant 
warmth, responsive and controllable) to our participants. 
There are considerable challenges for engendering 
and enacting change in everyday life. Constraints, 
uncertainties, risks, contexts, responsibility, trust are 
just some of the numerous aspects of analysis that this 
report has navigated through to unpack discussions by 
our participants associated with everyday lifestyle change. 
What we hope to have made clear are not just the reasons 
underpinning our participants’ views on changes to the 
energy system, but also the ways in which transitions can 
be facilitated at different scales ranging from the macro 
level (i.e. national government and industry) down to the 
micro-level (i.e. how individuals or small groups can be 
supported to make changes). That change needed to be 
targeted at all levels was both desired and understood by 
our participants. 
As highlighted in a number of sections responsibility for 
various aspects of transition were located across public, 
industry and government, rather than pertaining to 
one group or sector. Our participants voiced their own 
responsibilities in transitions across multiple forms of 
change and in many senses positioned themselves as 
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having an integral role, which in general was one they 
were accepting of. They also simultaneously expressed 
concerns about the limits to their role and the need 
for wider changes to occur to create opportunities for 
expressions of more sustainable choices. For example, 
there were changes that needed to occur that were 
beyond their range of action, like infrastructures for 
electric vehicles, or in the development of possibilities for 
different purchasing decisions particularly for expensive 
items that were changed irregularly. This related to a 
general sense of the importance of reciprocity between 
state, publics and (energy) companies. In addition, 
publics expressed frustration with what they saw as 
messages from government conflicting with the actions 
of both the institution and high profile individuals within 
government. Accordingly, publics desire government to 
have ‘body language’ (Wynne, 1996), i.e. ‘non-verbal cues’ 
(Durrant, 2008), that match political rhetoric. This in turn 
will underscore government’s commitment to change and 
give a clear steer to publics regarding the importance of 
the imperatives for change. 
Project Aim
Develop and utilise innovative methodological 
approaches for examining public values, attitudes 
and acceptability
 
Core to the wider project was an aim to develop 
innovative methods; an imperative posed by the particular 
challenges that existed in engaging people with futures 
and with whole energy system change. Several different 
approaches and techniques were developed through this 
particular work package in order to meet these challenges. 
The use of scenarios, or more crucially the use of an 
online tool which allowed participants to develop their 
own scenarios, was central to the methodology but this 
alone did not overcome the difficulties for engaging 
publics with the whole energy system and futures. The 
use of the tool was combined with a carefully designed 
facilitated discussion that allowed for multiple aspects 
of transitions and the interconnections between them 
to be explored with publics. This involved starting 
by engaging people with things that are part of their 
everyday experiences and embedded in their current lives 
(e.g. central heating systems) before moving to discuss 
things typically more abstracted from daily life like power 
stations. It also entailed situating people in ‘the now’ 
before moving them to think about change and futures; 
for example, we asked people to talk through how they 
currently heat their homes before asking them about 
change to this aspect of energy systems. 
In order to embed system changes more fully in everyday 
life we further utilised scenario narratives (see Appendix). 
These also necessitated carefully facilitated discussions 
in order to help people engage. Discussions around the 
scenario narratives occurred in the latter part of the day 
following deliberations about system transitions, and as 
such participants had already been reflecting on processes 
of change. This task thus represented a further stage of 
discussion through which participants were asked to 
think about what they currently do and what is desirable. 
This also served as a reflective period through which 
facilitators prompted participants to think about views 
they had expressed through the day. 
As discussed there are inherent difficulties in engaging 
participants in thinking about change including places 
or ways of living that do not exist at present. That 
being said, the approach taken in this research was 
highly successful in enabling participants to take on 
the complexities of the issues and express their views, 
perspectives and preferences. 
After note
As briefly mentioned at the start of the 
report there is a quantitative phase of 
research linked to the qualitative analysis 
we have presented here. 
The key findings from the survey phase of the project 
have been published in a separate related report. 
See Demski, C. Spence, A. and Pidgeon, N. (2013) 
Transforming the UK Energy System: Public Values, 
Attitudes and Acceptability – Summary findings of a 
survey conducted in August 2012 (UKERC: London).
There are connections between the findings of the 
two reports. However, points of connection and 
combined insights emerging out of both phases 
of research have been pursued through a further 
synthesis analysis. This analysis has allowed us to 
build a more detailed understanding of some key 
aspects of concern for publics with regards to energy 
system change. The synthesis analysis report will be 
available 16 July 2013.
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Future Vignette 2050: Business as usual
The familiar buzz of your gas boiler in 
the background tickles at the edge of 
your consciousness as you edge towards 
wakefulness. Running late, your partner asks 
you to take care of getting the kids’ breakfast 
this morning, as they dash out the door for 
work. Finally up, you put the water on to boil 
for your morning tea (you feel a moment 
of triumph that you managed to ensure 
that your landlord installed a gas hob – you 
just wish it wasn’t so expensive and the 
pipeline hadn’t been run through one of your 
favourite areas for walking). You call to your 
children, who are busily surfing the internet 
with cartoons on in the background, to get 
ready. 
Travel mug in hand you usher the kids out of the door 
and begin your drive first to their school and then work, 
cursing the troubles which have sent your fuel prices 
soaring (again), almost beyond your reach (maybe it’s 
time to sell that second car). On your commute the 
freight train, that never seems to end, thunders past 
you, containing our precious coal. You enter the city 
and immediately grind to a halt as congestion is now 
the norm 24/7. You try not to flinch as the buses smugly 
bumble past your inside. You would like some fresh air 
but are reminded of the time when as a kid you opened 
the car window and all you got was a mouthful of 
fumes (a mistake you've never made since!). The sight 
of cyclists gamely wearing ever more complex masks 
convinces you that your strategy of closed windows, 
whilst stuffy, is sound. 
The radio blares to life with news of the latest 
environmental disaster caused by ever more risky oil 
drilling. This is swiftly followed by the latest story about 
the growing problem of climate change immigrants 
that are hitting British shores. In the next bulletin you 
are reminded that climate change does not just happen 
over "there", given the ever encroaching ocean and 
persistent storm surges that threaten to cause even 
more flooding. That last thought makes you particularly 
grim as you are reminded of your own eviction notice 
(courtesy of the Government’s strategy to withdraw 
flood defences due to costs in some areas) sitting on 
your desk next to the red letter utilities bill. Water is 
also at a premium nowadays given the droughts the UK 
is increasingly victim to. 
You finally get parked. Once you arrive, the building 
begins to power down non-essential lighting and 
heating. Controlled energy use like this and planned 
rolling blackouts are the norm, but this is far preferable 
to the random blackouts and energy cuts that had 
happened at first. After a full day at work, you return 
home noticing your neighbour’s house is lit up; you tut 
to yourself wondering how they can justify and even 
afford such extravagant use of energy. You gather with 
your family to eat dinner. As you glance at a picture 
of your parents on your mantelpiece, you remember 
a time when energy and the environment didn’t even 
cross your mind.
You would like some fresh air 
but are reminded of the time 
when as a kid you opened the 
car window and all you got 
was a mouthful of fumes.
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Future Vignette 2050: Mixing it up
After inhaling your morning cuppa you head 
to the bus stop just in time to hear the quiet 
hum which signals the approach of your 
commuter electric bus. As you take a seat, 
your attention is momentarily drawn to the 
solar panels nestled near to your TV satellite 
dish. You make a mental note that they are 
due for a service soon - as is your ground 
source heat pump system. 
5 minutes later you are cursing as you remember 
you have left the computer on and have overridden 
the sensors which would normally turn it off with 
the absence of human interaction. No problem, you 
grab your smart phone and access your home system 
smart network, enabling you to turn it off remotely, 
even as you chug through the countryside. You have 
a momentary shock as the phone rings unexpectedly 
in your hand, noticing it’s your mother you endure 
another rant about the solar thermal water heating; 
a system she still hasn’t ever got the hang of. You tap 
a quick message off to your partner and ask them to 
swing by your mothers, after they’ve picked the kids up 
from school, to lend their aid as they have the hybrid 
biofuels electric car today. 
Meanwhile, to the left you are passing fields of gold 
containing crops for the local biomass power plant. 
To your right is a wind farm on the hill; you can’t 
understand why there is still opposition to such 
schemes. Now you're passing the turn off to the local 
nuclear power station which is set ("ominously" as  
your neighbour likes to jokingly say) on the peninsula. 
As your bus meanders around the suburbs and finally 
approaches the city, the road narrows where work 
continues to install the carbon capture and storage 
waste pipe network. Traffic, mainly other electric 
buses, trams and bicycles, starts to pick up, but never 
stagnates the flow. You yank open the bus window 
allowing fresh air to flow through the carriage. 
As you enter your office building, lights and electronics 
which were lying dormant in wait of a visitor, hum to 
life. You are informed that the video conference you 
scheduled in lieu of that flight to Amsterdam is due to 
start in 10 minutes. For your journey home the sunny 
day makes you decide to opt for a public hire bike. 
Hopping on you trundle along the busy cycle paths to 
your area, leaving the bike at the local bicycle rank and 
walking the short remaining distance to home. You 
arrive back to a warm house (“Thanks insulation!”)  
and settle in for a relaxing evening with your family. 
You have a momentary 
shock as the phone rings 
unexpectedly in your hand, 
noticing it’s your mother you 
endure another rant about 
the solar thermal water 
heating; a system she still 
hasn’t ever got the hang of.
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Future Vignette 2050: Low Carbon Living
You wake in the morning and make your 
way to the kitchen giving a passing glance 
to your real time display which shows your 
energy usage. You feel smug as it registers 
almost zero at this time in the morning; 
the background appliances like your 
fridge freezer must have been powered off 
overnight by your energy company as “smart 
metering” and demand management is now 
the norm. 
You add the precise amount of water to the kettle 
required for your morning cuppa. Sipping your 
drink you flick on the television at source – briefly 
remembering the days of “standby” – to watch the news 
managing to grab the headlines before the kids hijack 
it for cartoons. You hasten the teenager out of the door 
to begin their morning walk along with the rest of their 
classmates since “walk to school clubs” are common 
now. Your partner will take the electric car to work 
today, you scamper out quickly with the toddler, as you 
realise you may have forgotten to set the car to charge 
last night... You set off along a well established and 
busy cycle path breathing in the fresh clean air. As you 
crest the hill the new massive wind farm off the coast 
where you live comes into view (“Powering our Nation” 
– you smile at the thought of their cheesy slogan). 
On your return home from your brief trip to the nursery 
you settle in for your day’s work. Home working is 
now normal and you only go into a small office share 
building when you need to meet people face-to-face 
or conduct a video-conference. As you settle in you 
glance out of your window at a view dotted with solar 
panels and wind turbines, whilst far in the distance you 
can just make out the start of the great tidal barrage. 
You switch on your low energy computer and quickly 
scan through your emailed bills and bank statements. 
You notice a message from your energy supplier 
indicating that the forecast is for high winds tonight 
so a good time to run, at a lower cost non-time-critical 
appliances, like the washing machine, and turn your 
water on to heat – something you often forget to do. 
It’s a cold day but your heavily insulated home only 
requires a short burst from your electric heating system 
to top up the warmth generated by your ground source 
heat pump. 
In the evening you finish work for the day and help to 
make dinner, casting your mind back to the days when 
you cooked using gas. Your family congregates in the 
living room making sure lights, heating and appliances 
are off in the rest of the house. The main topic of 
discussion is the family holiday to mainland Europe 
travelling via the high speed train. You have a brief pang 
of nostalgia for the family holidays you took as a child 
to places like the USA that your own children will likely 
never experience. On your way to bed you turn to your 
energy display and begin your nightly ritual of ensuring 
all appliances are turned off and the washing machine 
is set to run its cycle before morning – the automated 
system means it will complete its cycle sometime in 
the night (a nice trick for levelling your demand). 
Your family congregates in the 
living room making sure lights, 
heating and appliances are 
off in the rest of the house.
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